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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
refusing to suppress the in-court identifications of the 
State's witnesses? 
(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
refusing to give Appellant's requested jury Instruction 
concerning eyewitness identification? 
(3) Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
instructing the jury with regard to inferences which might be 
drawn from unexplained possession of recently stolen property? 
(4) Was the Appellant improperly convicted of both a 
greater and lesser, included offense? 
(5) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a 
conviction? 
(6) Did the trial court err in denying the 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the Habitual Criminal Charge? 
(7) Did the cumulative effect of the errors prevent 
the Appellant from receiving a fair trial? 
-viii-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20557 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction 
against Paul Anthony Branch for Aggravated Robbery with a 
firearms enhancement under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as 
amended) and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended); 
Aggravated Assault, a felony of the third degree under Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended); and of being a Habitual 
Criminal under Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended). A 
jury found Mr. Branch guilty following a trial held from 
January 14-25, 1985, on all charges except that of being a 
Habitual Criminal, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge, presiding. The Habitual Criminal charge was 
tried to the Judge on February 25, 1985. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statement of Facts 
On August 18, 1984, at approximately 5:15 p.m., (R. 
473), two men entered the Oakwood Jewelry Store located at 7200 
South and 2200 East, in the Hillside Plaza, Salt Lake County, 
Utah (R. 472,590). The first man encountered the only employee 
in the store, Joanne Knaphus, and forced her at gunpoint into a 
restroom at the rear of the store (R. 616-618). At trial, the 
employee was unable to identify Mr. Branch as being one of the 
robbers (R. 625,642-644). 
A female customer, Stella Kyarsgaard, then entered the 
jewelry store and was escorted by the second man to the 
restroom area where she joined the store employee (R. 
1210-1217). While the first man guarded the two women the 
second man swept the jewelry display cases of their contents 
(R. 492), valued in excess of $110,000.00 (R. 975). After 
warning the two women to remain in the restroom for a period of 
time, the two men left the store (R. 1223-1224). 
A third woman, Marsha Wright, and her thirteen year 
old daughter, Misty, parked north of the jewelry store, noticed 
two men coming from the establishment carrying a large garbage 
bag (R. 1077-1080). The two men quickly got in a nearby car 
occupied by a third man and a woman and left the scene (R. 
1085-1088). 
On August 24, 1984, at approximately 2:30 p.m. (R, 
310-311), two Los Angeles Police Department Officers, traveling 
in an unmarked police car, (R. 311), entered the parking lot of 
the Pink Motel located near the predominantly Hispanic city of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pacoima, California, (R. 1025), on a routine patrol (R. 311). 
The officers observed several people moving about the parking 
lot (R. 931-932) and then noticed Raymond Johnson, a male 
Hispanic, seated in his beige Chevrolet automobile operating 
hydraulic lifts, which are illegal in California (R. 312-314). 
The officers then observed a female Hispanic, Jeanna Salazar, 
exit room ten of the Pink Motel and enter Raymond Johnson's 
vehicle (R. 313). 
After maneuvering their car into the parking lot the 
officers observed two other Hispanic individuals, David Allen 
Johnson, brother of Raymond, and Teresa Alvarez inside room ten 
of the motel (R. 315-316). David Allen Johnson appeared to be 
giving himself an intravenous injection (R. 318). After 
further observation of the four individuals, officers placed 
them under arrest for being under the influence of opiates (R. 
324-327). 
The officers then conducted a search of Raymond 
Johnson's car and room ten of the Pink Motel, which was 
registered under the name of Teresa Alvarez (R. 348-349). The 
search uncovered large amounts of jewelry stolen from the 
Oakwood Jewelry Store in addition to personal belongings and 
identification of persons other than the four arrested 
individuals, although no property or identification of Paul 
Branch was located (R. 957). 
Further investigation by the Los Angeles Police 
Department revealed that additional jewelry taken in the 
Oakwood robbery had been pawned at the Valley Gold and Silver Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exchange in North Hollywood, California (R. 778). A photo 
spread was then prepared which included a picture of Joey 
Miera, half brother of Appellant Paul Branch, which was 
confiscated from room ten of the Pink Motel (R. 955-957). The 
spread was shown to Isreal Babich, proprietor of the pawn shop, 
who selected the photograph of Joey Miera as possibly being one 
of the persons who pawned the stolen jewelry (R. 958). 
Although the picture picked in the photo spread by Mr. 
Babich had been found in a suitcase along with identification 
and correspondence belonging to Joey Miera (R. 946-957), Salt 
Lake County officers who were sent a copy of the photograph 
misidentified the person therein as being the Appellant, Paul 
Anthony Branch. A criminal warrant for aggravated robbery was 
then issued in Mr. Branch's name (R. 1396). 
On September 16, 1984, Officer David Madsen of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department stopped a vehicle driven by 
Appellant Paul Branch for traveling at an excessive rate of 
speed (R. 1398). Mr. Branch was subsequently arrested on the 
outstanding warrant (R. 1396-1398) and booked in the county 
jail (R. 1395). An inventory of Mr. Branch's property revealed 
that he held no jewelry and no driver's license and that he 
held only twelve cents (R. 1397-1398). 
Three defendants, brothers Raymond Jeffrey and Alan 
David Johnson, and Appellant Paul Anthony Branch were then 
jointly tried in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, 
presiding. Prior to trial, attorneys for the defendants moved Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to suppress in-court identifications by each and every State 
witness since previous identifications were inconsistent and 
unreliable (R. 472-538) After hearing argument on the motion, 
the trial court denied the request, allowing the State's 
witnesses to testify at trial (R. 442,557-558). 
Following completion of the defense, the Appellant 
again moved the court to exclude or strike eyewitness 
identifications of Appellant as being unreliable (R. 1581). 
This motion was based in part on the unreliable pre-trial and 
preliminary hearing identifications of the assailants by Ms. 
Stella Kyarsgaard, coupled with her trial testimony that Allen 
David Johnson, codefendant, was the man she saw at the jewelry 
store robbery and not the Appellant, an identification then 
recanted (R. 1581). These in-trial identifications were in 
complete conflict with the woman's earlier descriptions and 
with her claims at the preliminary hearing (R. 1207-1242). The 
motion was again denied (R. 1618-1619). 
Defendants also submitted pre-trial motions to sever 
the cases (R. 572-578) and to dismiss charges of Theft and 
Aggravated Assault as they were lesser included offenses of 
Aggravated Robbery (R. 302-303,558-561). Both motions were 
denied (R. 583). 
During the trial a Motion in Limine was submitted by 
the defendants to exclude any testimony with regard to the 
discovery of marijuana, syringes and other paraphernalia seized 
at the Pink Motel (R. 686-691). However, without regard to the 
trial court's ruling on this motion the prosecution elicited Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testimony which referred to the seizure of sponges and syringes 
(R. 772). Because of this, counsel for the Appellant 
subsequently moved for a mistrial which was denied (R. 797-798). 
In addition, the Appellant presented the jury with an 
alibi witness. The record reveals that Ms. Ruby Archuletta, 
Aunt to Mr. Branch, testified that he man was with her on the 
day of the robbery (R. 1370-94). 
Following the trial to the jury, the Appellant and 
Raymond Johnson were found guilty on all charges (R. 
1694-1697). Defendant Branch was also found guilty of being a 
Habitual Criminal (R. 1757). He was sentenced five years to 
life for the Aggravated Robbery conviction, one to fifteen 
years for Theft, one to fifteen years for being a Habitual 
Criminal and zero to five years for Aggravated Assault (R. 
1783), all terms to run concurrently except for an additional 
year for a firearms enhancement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Paul Branch, the Appellant, first contends that the 
trial court erred in refusing to suppress identifications of 
him by prosecution witnesses. The identifications were 
unreliable and inconsistent with previous identifications by 
the same and other witnesses. For example, Officer James 
Penrod initially identified a photograph of a man other than 
Mr. Branch as being Mr. Branch. Another prosecution witness, 
Stella Kyarsgaard identified another codefendant at trial and 
- 6 -
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then, after a recess, changed her testimony and identified Mr. 
Branch. Such tenuous identifications should have never been 
allowed. 
The appellant next asserts that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give a requested instruction on eyewitness 
identification. In light of the tenuous identifications of the 
defendant, the court abused its discretion in refusing such an 
instruction. 
Next, the Appellant alleges that the trial court erred 
in giving Jury Instruction No. 19. That instruction deprived 
him of his right to remain silent and shifted the burden of 
proof from the state to the defense. 
The Appellant claims that he was improperly charged 
and convicted of both greater and lesser offenses. Two 
offenses, theft and aggravated assault, should have been merged 
into the offense of aggravated robbery. 
Further, Mr. Branch contests his conviction for being 
a Habitual Criminal. During the habitual criminal proceeding 
the state failed to show that his previous convictions were 
constitutionally valid. 
The Appellant argues that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction. The evidence was not 
only inconclusive with respect to Mr. Branch but tended to 
incriminate another person. 
Finally, Mr. Branch contends that the cumulative 
effect of the multitude of errors in this case deprived him of 
a fair trial. 
"
:
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUPPRESS IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF 
THE DEFENDANT BY STATE WITNESSES. 
Prior to trial the Appellant, Paul Branch, submitted a 
motion to the trial court to suppress in-court identifications 
by all witnesses for the State (R. 49, 434-434,472) (See 
Addendum A). Included as part of the motion was a request to 
prevent testimony relating to prior identifications (R. 
478-479). The basis of the motion was that prior 
identifications of the Appellant by state witnesses were so 
unreliable as to render them excludable under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel provided 
the trial court with police reports in which descriptions were 
given of the assailant subsequently identified at trial as 
Appellant, copies of each of two preliminary hearings and a 
summary of the discrepancies in the witness1 statements (R. 
476-477). After hearing argument (R. 472-494) the motion was 
denied (R. 539). 
Beginning with the landmark decisions in U.S. v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 
(1967); and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); the United 
States Supreme Court attempted to establish effective 
safeguards governing the admission of eyewitness evidence of 
identification in federal and state criminal trials. Prior to 
4-v^ ao ^ risinns this had been a neglected area of criminal law, 
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yet one which the Wade Court described as especially riddled 
with enumerable dangers that might seriously, even crucially 
derogate from a fair trial. In a departure from precedent, 
unusual even for a case developing constitutional safeguards, 
the Court discussed in Wade the dangers inherent in eyewitness 
identification: 
"The influence of improper suggestion upon 
identifying witnesses probably accounts for 
more miscarriages of justice than any other 
single factor—perhaps it is responsible for 
more such errors than all other factors 
combined." 
Id. at 229 (quoting P.Wall, Eyewitness Identification in 
Criminal Cases (1965)). 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has 
been well documented in both law review articles^ and court 
cases.2 The commentators note that reasons for this 
ipid Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony 
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. 
Rev. 969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. 
Ky.L.Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental 
Studies of Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); 
Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
21 Crim. L.Q. 361 (1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); 
Public Defender Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); 
Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); 
Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 
1974 Bull. Psychonomic Socfy. 191; Buckhout, Eyewitness 
Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim. Def., 
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levme & Tapp, The Psychology 
of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. 
Pa. L.Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in 
Eyewitness Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8; 
Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the 
Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976). 
2For example, a 1979 unreported prosecution in Wilmington, 
Delaware, against Reverand Bernard Pagan who was accused of 
robbing six Delaware stores during the winter of 1978. At the 
trial he was falsely identified by several state witnesses as 
the robber. The charges were dismissed after another man, the 
real robber, confessed to the crimes. See State v. Warren, 635 
P.2d 1236 (Kan. 1981) . 
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unreliability are found in the problems that are associated 
with human perception and memory, both of which play a vital 
role in eyewitness identification. As this Court noted in 
State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1972): 
"We recognize that caution must be observed 
to see that injustice does not result from 
the use of methods which unfairly focus 
attention upon a particular suspect to 
influence the witnesses in their identification." 
While the Appellant concedes that police officers 
should not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to 
investigate crimes and to identify those who have committed 
them, extreme caution should prevail when identifications 
appear to be unreliable. This is because, as the Kansas 
Supreme Court noted in State v. Warren, Supra: 
The trouble is that many judges have 
assumed that an "eyeball" witness, who 
identifies the accused as the criminal, 
is the most reliable of witnesses, and 
if there are any questions about the 
identification, the jurors, in their 
wisdom, are fully capable of determining 
the credibility of the witness without 
special instructions from the court. 
Yet cases of mistaken identification 
are not infrequent and the problem of 
misidentification has not been alleviated. 
J[d. at 1241.3 
Yet, in spite of the great volume of literature on the 
subject of eyewitness testimony the courts in this country have 
been slow to take the problem seriously. Sobel, Eyewitness 
Identification: Legal and Practical Problems, (1985). 
Beginning, however, with the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy of 
3This Court has adopted language as to eyewitness 
identification which is similar in State v. Wilson, 608 P.2d Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cases, courts have declared that where unreliable or unduly 
suggestive identifications are considered in trials, the 
defendants thereby prejudiced are denied due process of law. 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); State v. Wellstein, 501 
P.2d 1084 (Utah 1972) . 
The United States Supreme Court finally espoused 
standards to be followed in determining the admissibility of 
eyewitness identification at trial in Neil v. Biggers, Supra. 
Biggers concerned a respondent who had been convicted in a 
Tennessee court of rape, on evidence consisting in part of the 
victim's visual and voice identification of Biggers at a 
stationhouse showup seven months after the crime. The victim 
had been in her assailant's presence for some time and had 
directly observed him indoors and under a full moon outdoors. 
She testified that she had "no doubt" that Biggers was her 
assailant. She previously had given the police a description 
of the assailant and she made no identification of others 
presented at previous showups, lineups, or photo spreads. 
In a federal habeas proceeding, the District Court 
held that the stationhouse confrontation was so suggestive as 
to violate due process and the Court of Appeals affirmed at 448 
F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court reversed and held 
that the evidence properly had been allowed to go to the jury 
409 U.S. at 198. 
- 11 -
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The United States Supreme Court, however, expressed 
concern about the lapse of seven months between the crime and 
the confrontation and observed that "this would be a seriously 
negative factor in most cases." Ijd. at 201. The "central 
question," however, was "whether under the 'totality of the 
circumstances1 the identification was reliable." rd. at 199; 
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
The factors listed by the court to be considered in 
evaluating the likelihood of misidentification included (1) the 
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) 
the witness1 degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the 
witness1 prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and 
(5) the length of the time between the crime and the 
confrontation, rd. at 199. The admission of testimony with a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification warrants reversal 
of a conviction, Ij3. at 198. See also: Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 
353 (Utah 1980) . 
A. THE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF 
OFFICER PENROD WAS UNRELIABLE AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
At trial, Officer James Penrod of the Los Angeles 
Police Department was allowed to identify the Appellant Branch 
as a Hispanic man who was observed walking across the parking 
lot of the Pink Motel just prior to the arrest of the Johnson 
brothers and the recovery of stolen jewelry (R. 696). The 
Officer's view of the man claimed to be the Appellant took Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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place as the officer drove by him on a routine patrol (R. 
311). The policeman's attention was not focused on the man as 
there was no evidence then available which indicated illegal 
activity was taking place and the view took place only for a 
matter of seconds (R. 953-955). Officer Penrod later 
identified a photograph of Joey Miera as the man he passed in 
the parking lot, an identification later retracted (R. 
953-955), even though officer Penrod admitted that the police 
investigation at the Pink Motel revealed no independent 
evidence that Paul Branch was ever present there (R. 954-957). 
Because of the circumstances surrounding the identification of 
Mr. Branch as the man walking in the Pink Motel parking lot by 
Officer Penrod, his testimony should have been excluded.4 
The witness1 opportunity for observation is the first 
standard of the Biggers test for admissibility and the factor 
most frequently mentioned in such cases. Sobel, supra. A 
crime of long duration affords a witness or victim a good 
opportunity to observe and retain the image of the perpetrator 
while a brief view generally does not. Where the witness has 
had only a few seconds to observe the criminal, the opportunity 
to view has been deemed inadequate. Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 
108 (2nd Cir. 1978)(four eyewitnesses to the fatal shooting of 
bartender during robbery had only a few seconds to observe 
gunman before scrambling for cover); State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d 
4The objection also extends to the identification of 
the Appellant by Officer Figueroa. However, since Figueroa's 
view of the suspect was under the exact same circumstances (R. 
1 0 3 5 - 3 7 . 1 0 5 9 - 6 ? } ^ff (lffir*or D o n v ^ ^ « 1 T T T > ^ ~ V . ~ ^ ! ~ j-~~i--- -' -
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247 (Me. 1979)(for only a few seconds witness saw robber 
running out of store); Rustin v. State, 415 A.2d 631 (Md. App. 
1980)(witness viewed suspect for not more than five to ten 
seconds). In the instant case one can hardly say Officer 
Penrod viewed the suspect for an adequate period. Here Officer 
Penrod viewed the suspect for an inadequate period. While 
witnesses to other crimes may spend considerable time with the 
perpetrator, here Officer Penrod only viewed this person in 
passing, completely unaware of any possible wrongful acts. 
A second factor in determining reliability of an 
identification is the presence or absence of circumstances , 
likely to attract attention to the perpetrator. For example, 
many courts have noted that rape victims are not casual, 
inattentive observers, but are likely to pay close attention to 
the assailant. Wicks v. Lockhart, 569 F. Supp. 549, 554 (E.D. 
Ark. 1983). In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court considered the reliability of an 
eyewitness who was an undercover narcotics agent in the process 
of making a drug purchase. Under these circumstances the 
witness was deemed likely to be paying close attention to the 
suspect's appearance. Id. at 114-115. 
Here, however, there was clearly no behavior which 
could have attracted the attention of Officer Penrod to the man 
in the parking lot. Penrod was on a routine patrol which was 
frequently run on a daily basis (R. 311-312). The regular 
patrol certainly involved passing hundreds of individuals, 
making it unlikely that Penrod would notice but a few people 
who somehow stood out from the others. In addition, Penrod was Digitized by the Howard W. Hun er Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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any arrest warrant for a man resembling the Appellant (R. 
311-312,930-931). 
Furthermore, the unreliability of Penrod's 
identification is enhanced by the fact that his attention as he 
entered the Pink Motel parking lot was focused on the car owned 
by Raymond Johnson. Johnson was in his car operating newly 
acquired hydraulic lifters, illegal in the state of California 
(R. 314). The fact that Penrod further investigated the 
"suspicious" behavior of Raymond Johnson, ignoring the person 
walking across the parking lot, clouds the reliability of the 
identification of the latter. 
An analysis of Penrod's field notes and police report 
also reveals that the officer made no notations regarding the 
man in the parking lot (R. 931), and the man was never stopped 
for questioning. Given the limited glance that Penrod gave the 
suspect as they passed and the complete absence of any 
noticeable behavior by the man one must question the 
reliability of the identification of that man as Paul Branch. 
Still, the Appellant readily admits that if an 
eyewitness is able to give a detailed, accurate description of 
the alleged perpetrator, such a description would support 
reliability. The accuracy of the witness1 description is the 
third step in the Biggers reliability test. An in-court 
identification of a defendant which does not match in 
substantial respects the description given at the scene or 
shortly thereafter indicates the witness did not have a clear 
image of the perpetrator. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
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As earlier indicated, Officer Penrod made no notations 
with regard to the person alleged to be Paul Branch (R. 931). 
In fact, Penrod made no mention of the suspect in question 
until several hours after the men passed. Even then Penrodfs 
identification was of a man named Joey Miera, not the Appellant 
(R. 951-955). It was not until a few days before trial that 
Penrod recanted his earlier identification, six months after 
the men passed each other at the Pink Motel (R. 955). 
Both Biggers and Braithwaite list the witness's level 
of certainty at the confrontation as a factor of reliability. 
409 U.S. at 199; and 432 U.S. at 114. However, it has become 
so common for a witness to express confidence in his own 
opinion that this factor is usually just one of many supporting 
an identification, but it is rarely determinative. See People 
v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1984); State v. Newman, 688 
P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1984). Even experienced judges understand that 
the most positive witness is not always the most reliable. 
United States v. Johnson, 452 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Here, however, the record is inconclusive as to 
Penrod's level of certainty. He admits that his view of Branch 
in the courtroom was his first encounter with the Appellant 
since they allegedly passed in the motel parking lot (R. 
953-955), six months earlier. In addition, Penrod admits that 
Joey Miera, the man first identified by the officer, resembles 
the Appellant (R. 953). (See Addendum B). Such an admission 
could only leave doubt in Penrod's mind. Was the man walking 
in the Pink Motel parking lot really Paul Branch or was it Joey 
Miera, a man of similar appearance? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Further, Penrod's certainty of identification is 
clouded by the fact that he looked at several pictures of Joey 
Miera when later searching room ten of the Pink Motel. Courts 
have unanimously held suspect situations where a witness only 
views photographs of one individual. State v. Johnson, 605 
S.W.2d 151,153 (Mo. App. 1980). Penrod's viewing of Miera here 
is "one of the most suggestive photographic identification 
procedures that can be used." Sobel, supra. 
The final factor considered in Biggers as to 
reliability is the time interval between the crime and the 
identification. In Biggers, the showup was held reliable even 
though seven months had elapsed between the rape and the 
confrontation. This was because there was much supporting 
indicia of reliability. 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). 
Here, however, almost all circumstantial evidence 
presented at trial support Penrod's earlier identification of 
Joey Miera rather than the Appellant. Codefendant David Alan 
Johnson testified under oath that Miera had brought the stolen 
jewelry with him (R. 1475). Johnson further testified that the 
Appellant did not travel with him to California (R. 1469) nor 
was Branch ever seen in the state (R. 1491). 
In addition, Johnson testified that Joey Miera had 
actually spent a night in room ten of the motel (R. 1491) and, 
indeed, clothing, letters and pictures owned by Miera were 
found in the room (R, 1582-1583). Finally, Johnson indicated 
that he saw Miera, not Paul Branch, just before being arrested 
(R. 1486). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Also independently conflicting evidence of the 
identification is present in the selection of Miera's 
photograph as one of the men who sold the jewelry by Israel 
Babich, proprietor of the Valley Gold and Silver Exchange (R. 
956). When Babich confronted the Appellant Branch at trial 
instead of Miera, no identification could be made (R. 
1329,1343,1350,1363). 
Thus, a view of the factors listed in Biggers to 
determine reliability clearly shows Penrod's in-court 
identification should have been excluded. The encounter at the 
Pink Motel was brief and of no consequence until after the 
officer saw suggestive pictures several hours later. The 
unidentified man in the parking lot did nothing to attract 
Penrod's attention, was never questioned or associated with 
those arrested, and was never seen again. In addition, all 
other evidence, including the identification of Miera as the 
man in the parking lot by two persons, question Penrod's 
testimony. Under such tenuous circumstances the identification 
of the Appellant by Officer Penrod should never have been 
allowed. 
B. THE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF 
STELLA KYARSGAARD WAS UNRELIABLE AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
In addition to the exclusion of Officer Penrod's 
testimony, the trial court also erred in not omitting the 
identification testimony of Stella Kyarsgaard , an eyewitness 
to the Oakwood Jewelry burglary. Prior to trial defense 
counsel moved the court to omit Ms. Kyarsgaard's eyewitness 
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identification of Mr. Branch because it was unreliable (R. 
515). The motion was based upon discrepancies in certain 
statements made by the witness to the police officers and later 
at the preliminary hearing. (See Addendum C). The motion was 
denied and Ms. Kyarsgaard was allowed to testify (R. 
442,557-558). 
The record reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard worked at a 
business near the Oakwood Jewelry Store (R. 1207-1208) and had 
gone to Oakwoodfs to pick up some rings which were being 
cleaned (R. 1210). As she entered the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard 
testified she saw a man taller than herself dressed in a blue 
jumpsuit with a baseball cap pulled over his head and wearing 
dark sunglasses (R. 1212-1213). He was not looking at Ms. 
Kyarsgaard, but rather was peering into a glass display case 
which contained numerous items of jewelry (R. 1212). 
Unaware that she was happening upon a robbery, Ms. 
Kyarsgaard inquired about her rings. At this point the man 
shouted "Bob" to a second man who was apparently in the rear 
section of the store (R. 1213). Thinking the man was calling 
the store owner, also named Bob, Ms. Kyarsgaard testified she 
voluntarily went to the rear of the store (R. 1213-1214). 
As she began to enter the rear of the jewelry store, 
Ms. Kyarsgaard testified she was pushed from behind by the man 
in the front area into the rear where a second man, armed with 
a gun, escorted her to a bathroom where she remained for the 
course of the robbery (R. 1215-1217). When asked to identify 
the second man who was in the rear of the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated she never saw the man's face and could only estimate his 
height (R. 1220-1221). 
When asked at trial to identify the first man in the 
front of the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard readily pointed to the 
codefendant, David Alan Johnson, (R. 1212) and described for 
the court what Mr. Johnson was wearing. After a brief recess 
however, Ms. Kyarsgaard returned to the witness stand, recanted 
her identification of Mr. Johnson and identified the Appellant, 
Paul Branch, as the man in the front of the jewelry store (R. 
1226-1228). Mr. Johnson and Mr. Branch do not resemble each 
other. Johnson is 5fll" with medium build while Branch is 5'4" 
with a slight build (R. 1233-1237). 
At the close of the defense case, the Appellant again 
moved the court to exclude the identification testimony as 
being unreliable (R. 1581). An analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding the robbery reveals that under Biggers, the 
identification testimony should have been excluded. 
As discussed earlier, the first factor to consider in 
determining the reliability of Ms. Kyarsgaard's identification 
is the length of time she viewed the suspect. The longer the 
viewing the more reliable the identification. Yet here the 
record clearly reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard only spent a few 
seconds with the suspect as she was entering the jewelry store 
(R. 1211-1215). In fact, the two individuals1 contact was so 
brief that there was only time for a single verbal exchange 
between them (R, 1213-1214) 
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At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard originally 
estimated that her contact with the man in the front of the 
store lasted for several minutes. (Addendum C at 160-161). 
However, under cross examination she admitted that, in reality, 
the contact had only been for a matter of seconds. (Addendum C 
at 161). Under such a situation, Ms. Kyarsgaard's 
identification should clearly be viewed with suspicion. See 
Jackson v. Fogg, supra; State v. Commeau, supra. 
In Wood v. State, 713 P.2d 1046 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986) the Oklahoma Court of Appeals considered the 
admissibility of identification testimony from a victim who 
viewed his assailants for a brief period. As in the present 
case the victim testified he was certain of his attacker's 
identity. Yet, due to general discrepancies in the victim's 
statements the court held that: 
"[T]he trial court should have granted 
appellant's demurrer to the evidence at the 
close of the State's case. The victim's only 
opportunity to observe his assailant was at 
the crime scene. He had only a few seconds to 
observe both attackers when he looked over his 
shoulder and saw them ten feet away running 
towards him. Even in that brief space of time 
the victim admitted his attention was split 
between the man who hit him and the other assailant 
who he had noticed at the door of the arcade. 
J^ d. at 1047. 
The second factor to consider is the degree of 
attention focused on the suspect. Are there circumstances 
surrounding the viewing which would make the suspect noticeable 
to the eyewitness? If so, the identification is held to be 
more reliable, Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Here, the Appellant concedes that the clothing worn by 
the suspect was unusual for a normal store employee. Yet, 
given that the jewelry store was preparing to move to a new 
location the suspect might easily have been mistaken for a 
mover. Indeed, such a theory was advanced by another witness 
for the state who observed the two men enter the jewelry store 
(R. 1152).
 u 
Regardless of the suspect's clothing however, Ms. 
Kyarsgaard testified that she was not aware of the crime until 
after she viewed the suspect and began to enter the rear of the 
store. The record reveals that Ms. Kyarsgaard entered the 
store and inquired about her rings. Then the following 
occurred: 
Q. (by the State) He yelled Bob? 
A. Uh huh, I thought he did, yeah. 
Q. And you said, "Never mind, I will 
do it?" 
A. "I will go back." 
Q. Will you draw a dotted line along 
the route where you walked. 
A . I walked up here and I got here 
and I thought something is not right... 
Q. What occurred when you got to the 
point ... where you thought something 
was not right? What was it that made 
you think something was not right? 
A. I don't know. Nobody came out to 
say hello to me, like Bob would or Joanne P ; 
would. 
(R. 1215). 
Thus, the record shows that Ms. Kyarsgaard thought 
nothing was unusual until after she viewed the suspect. She 
was not alarmed about the man's appearance nor by his actions Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Indeed, had Ms. Kyarsgaard become aware that she had stumbled 
upon a robbery she would have hardly walked up to the suspect 
to inquire about her rings or volunteered to enter the rear of 
the store. 
The Appellant concedes that from the point where Ms. 
Kyarsgaard became "suspicious" her testimony would be more 
reliable. As outlined in Biggers, once Ms. Kyarsgaard knew of 
the robbery her attention would focus on the men in a way that 
a casual viewer would not. Yet, the testimony reveals that Ms. 
Kyarsgaard never again viewed the man in front. He pushed her 
to the rear of the store from behind, and she never again saw 
his face (R. 1215-1216). (Addendum C at 160-161). 
The third factor to consider here is the accuracy of 
prior descriptions given by Ms. Kyarsgaard of the suspect. 
While the witness was able to tentatively identify the 
Appellant in a photographic display several weeks following the 
robbery, such identification is not dispositive of the issue. 
Several variations in Ms. Kyarsgaard's identifications cloud 
the credibility of her testimony. 
At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard identified 
the Appellant as the man she observed in front of the store. 
In fact, the preliminary hearing transcript indicates the 
witness left the stand and physically touched the Appellant. 
(Addendum C at 143). 
Yet at trial, Ms. Kyarsgaard identified codefendant 
Allen David Johnson as the man she encountered in the store. 
Not only did she point to Mr. Johnson, but she described for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the court the clothing he was wearing. All of this was done 
without reservation, and in spite of the fact that Mr. Johnson 
looks nothing like the Appellant who was in the courtroom at 
the time (R. 1181). Indeed, it was not until after the court 
recessed for a period and Ms. Kyarsgaard had retaken the stand 
that she was able to identify the Appellant Branch (R. 
1227-28). 
The fourth factor to consider under Biggers is the 
level of certainty claimed by the eyewitness in making the 
identification. Here again, the identification is questionable 
at best. While Ms. Kyarsgaard, after recanting her 
identification of Allen Johnson, claims she is sure the suspect 
was Mr. Branch, several factors question such a claim. 
At the preliminary hearing Ms. Kyarsgaard stated the 
following: 
Q. (by the State) Will you give us a 
description? 
A. I can only give you a slight one of 
the one that was in the bathroom because 
I didn't see his face, but the one in the 
showcase... 
Q. Did you see the face of the one in the 
showcase? 
A. Well, he had glasses on so it is a 
little difficult. (Emphasis added.) 
(Addendum C at 142). 
In addition, testimony reveals that at trial the witness was 
also mistaken as to the height of the suspect (R. 1233-1234), 
who kept his head down as the witness entered the jewelry store 
(Addendum C at 146). She was adamant that this man was her 
height, yet, she was forced to acknowledge both at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial that the Appellant, who stood Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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next to her, was substantially shorter than she (R. 
1223-1237). Ms. Kyarsgaard also testified that she had never 
seen the suspect before the robbery, further reducing her 
familiarity with the man. 
Finally, the time period between the criminal 
encounter and the identification requires scrutiny. In this 
case the Appellant does not now question the selection of Mr. 
Branch from a photo array a few weeks after the crime. 
However, it is important to note that Mr. Branch was only one 
of two selections made by Ms. Kyarsgaard as possibly being the 
suspect (R. 1237-1238). The other selection was never charged 
(R. 1238). 
The identification made in court, however, was done 
over six months after the encounter. This is nearly as long as 
that in Biggers, which was disturbing to the Court. Here, 
given the limited view the eyewitness had of the burglar, who 
was wearing a hat and dark glasses, her testimony should have 
been excluded. This is especially true given her initial 
identification of Alan David Johnson, who looks nothing like 
the Appellant Branch. (R. 1233-37) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANTfS 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
At the close of the defense, the defense submitted a 
requested jury instruction on the reliability of eyewitness 
identification presented at trial. (See Addendum D) (R. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
101-102). The instruction was justified because discrepancies 
in claims made by state eyewitnesses rendered their testimony 
questionable. Since the eyewitness identifications comprised 
most of the proof given by the State against the Appellant, the 
defense argued the instruction was crucial (R, 1619-1620). The 
trial court denied the instruction (R. 101-102) and counsel for 
Appellant excepted (R. 1619-20). 4 
This Court in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 
1980); and in State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969); held 
that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any 
basis in the evidence to support that theory. As noted in 
State v.Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), the defendants 
entitlement to a particular jury instruction is not absolute. 
Rather, it is conditioned upon the existence of evidence 
supporting a theory before the instruction is warranted. Where 
a defendant has asserted a defense to justify or excuse a 
criminal charge and where there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support it, viability of the defense then becomes a 
question of fact and the jury should be charged regarding it. 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). In instances where 
the refusal of a requested instruction results in a compromise 
of the defendant's presumption of innocence, the refusal is 
considered prejudicial. United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 
(8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). 
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Initially, the Appellant concedes that there is no 
constitutional right or other requirement that presently exists 
which mandates that a trial court specifically instruct juries 
on the inherent fallibility of eyewitness identification. In 
fact, this Court in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), 
left the decision of whether or not to read the Telfaire-type 
instruction to the jury in the discretion of the trial court. 
See also: State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1984). 
Where the eyewitness identification is the sole basis 
for a conviction and a possibility exists for 
misidentification, trial courts should give a special 
eyewitness instruction to the jury. As the court noted in 
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 552. 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards 
the common law system must be a premise that 
is realized in instruction and not merely a 
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we 
have pointed out the importance of and need 
for special instruction on the key issue of 
identification, which emphasized to the jury 
the need for finding that the circumstances of 
the identification are convincing beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
While courts across the country are divided as to 
whether to require the Telfaire-type instruction, movement 
clearly seems to be toward the giving of the instruction. Both 
the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have strongly recommended the 
use of Telfaire instructions in cases where identification is a 
key issue. See United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 
1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Approval of the instruction has been made in numerous states, 
including Utah, under certain conditions. See State v. 
Malmrose, supra; State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kansas 1981); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. 1979); State 
v. Benjamin, 363 A.2d 726 (Conn. Supp. 1976); State v. Calica, 
514 P.2d 1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 917 > 
(1974). 
In Utah, support for giving a Telfaire instruction has 
even been advanced by the State in oral arguments before this 
Court in State v. Quevedo, Utah Supreme Court No. 19049 (argued 
November 14, 1985), and in State v. Jonas, Utah Supreme Court 
No. 20184 (argued November 15, 1985). As the State noted in 
Quevedo: 
"If the State's case is based primarily on 
eyewitness identification testimony, then 
in most cases a Telfaire-type instruction 
should be given." Quevedo, Oral Argument 
(11/14/86). 
In fact, the State in Jonas actually encouraged this Court to 
adopt a standard mandating the instruction be given in 
appropriate cases, noting: 
"A standard which would require the 
giving of a Telfaire-type of instruction 
in cases which are primarily based upon 
eyewitness identification would be a 
clear guide to the trial court and a 
clear guide to the State and to defense 
counsel as to when these types of 
instructions were appropriate." 
Jones, Oral Argument (11/15/86). 
The State indicated in Jonas that its position was changed 
because of the number of appeals generated by this Court's 
current discretionary review standards and because "[T]he 
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literature on this subject weighs in favor of this type of 
instruction and can really only help the truth finding process 
in a criminal case." Id. 
This Court, in spite of the current confusion over 
when to give the Telfaire instruction, has on numerous 
occasions found error in a trial court's refusal to give the 
instruction but upheld convictions on other grounds. See State 
v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) (No error when witness had 
ample time to view suspect under ideal conditions);); State v. 
Watson, supra (No error when instruction particularly addressed 
weaknesses which defendant raised in trial); State v. Bingham, 
684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) (No error since requested instruction 
adequately covered in other instructions); State v. Malmrose, 
supra. (No error where defense counsel failed to take 
exception to the trial court's refusal to give the 
instruction). Under the facts of this case, however, the Court 
is presented with an ideal opportunity to clarify when a 
Telfaire-type instruction is warranted in a criminal case and 
to enhance the ultimate search for truth. 
The Appellant has already documented the various 
pitfalls which are associated with eyewitness identification, 
(this brief at Point I). In addition, unlike the situation in 
Malmrose, the trial court here was notified by pre-trial motion 
of the discrepancies in testimony of all witnesses for the 
State (R. 472-538). The trial court was provided full copies 
of preliminary hearing transcripts, police reports, and table 
summaries of conflicts in identifications (R. 476-477). A Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
motion was made and argued that these unreliable 
identifications be excluded and was subsequently denied (R. 
442,557-558). 
During trial, defense counsel continued to object to 
consideration of eyewitness testimony and the trial court's 
attention was directed toward numerous misidentifications by 
police officers and toward limitations in circumstances 
surrounding the viewing. The specific pitfalls in the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses are set forth in this brief in 
Point I. These weaknesses in identifications were made 
glaringly obvious during the trial when one eyewitness 
misidentified one codefendant as the robber and then returned 
to the stand after a recess and recanted her testimony (R. 
1226-1228). 
At the close of the case, there was no evidence 
presented by the state other than eyewitness identifications of 
the Appellant which linked him to the crime. There were no 
photographs of the robbery, no fingerprints, and no distinctive 
elements relating the Appellant to the crime. The Appellant, 
when arrested, had no jewelry, no drivers license and no 
money. A search of his automobile also revealed no 
incriminating evidence (R. 1397-1398). 
The credibility and reliability of the eyewitness 
identification was further illustrated by testimony that the 
suspect was wearing a baseball cap, dark sunglasses and blue 
overalls which concealed his true identity. Unlike the 
situation in Newton, here no witness was afforded a clear view Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the perpetrators. This is especially apparent given that 
fully three witnesses misidentified the appellant, who 
established an alibi defense (R. 1370-1393). 
At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel again 
requested eyewitness testimony be excluded as being unreliable 
(R. 540-41) and the motion was again denied (R. 442,557-558). 
Subsequently, defense counsel submitted a Telfaire type 
instruction, which was also denied (R. 101-102). Defense 
counsel took exception to the ruling (R. 1619-1620). 
Clearly, here this Court is confronted with a 
situation where a Telfaire type instruction was not only 
warranted, but quite possibly crucial in determining the 
ultimate outcome of the trial. As noted by the State in Jonas, 
the instruction, if given, would have stated "what the jurors 
ought to look for in a given case to determine whether or not 
the identification is or is not reliable." Without the 
instruction there is a clear possibility that the Appellant was 
denied his presumption of innocence by assigning undue weight 
to the eyewitness testimonies. 
This Court should be especially sensitive to the 
situation given the State's position in Quevedo that "the State 
cannot really come up with a compelling answer why Telfaire 
ought not be given rather routinely in cases that depend to a 
large extent on eyewitness identification." In this case the 
failure of the trial court was particularly prejudicial and 
warrants reversal. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY WITH REGARD TO INFERENCES WHICH MIGHT 
BE DRAWN FROM UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION OF 
RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY, 
The Appellant, as noted in the Information (R. 23-25), 
was charged with one count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of 
the first degree. In conjunction with that charge, the trial 
court instructed the jury that possession of recently stolen 
property, when unexplained, created an inference that the 
person holding such property stole it. Instruction 19 read as 
follows: 
Under the law of the State of Utah, 
possession of property recently stolen, 
when a person in possession fails to 
make a satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, is a fact from which you may 
infer that the person in possession stole 
such property (R. 188). 
At the time when Instruction 19 was presented to the 
jury for consideration in reaching a verdict, defense counsel 
strenuously objected (R. 1619-1620). On appeal the Appellant 
notes that the instruction prejudiced his right to a fair trial 
for three reasons. 
Initially, Mr. Branch notes that at no time was he 
ever found to have been in possession of stolen property. 
Officers Penrod and Figueroa of the Los Angeles Police 
Department identified Mr. Branch under questionable 
circumstances (this brief at Point I) as walking near the front 
office of the Pink Motel but never placed the Appellant or 
items of his personal possession in the room where the stolen Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the jury applied the inference to the Appellant warrants 
reversal. 
Assuming that the jury believed Penrod and found Mr. 
Branch to be at the Pink Motel and thus by inference in 
possession of stolen property, the Appellant notes that the 
jury instruction deprived him of his right to remain silent by 
requiring the "person in possession" to explain how he obtained 
the stolen property. Without such an explanation by the 
Appellant, the instruction allowed the jury to infer the 
jewelry was stolen by him. Such a situation clearly violates 
Mr. Branch's right to remain silent. 
Instruction 19 is in part based on Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(1)(1953) which states that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facia evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property." 
While the Appellant concedes the constitutionality of the 
statute, he does challenge the instruction as read to the 
jury. See State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861, 868 (Utah 1981). 
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution a defendant in a criminal trial may not be 
compelled to testify on his own behalf. To require a defendant 
to testify on his own behalf is a form of self incrimination 
which is clearly prohibited. 
Here, the instruction as read to the jury required 
testimony from the Appellant since it stated that an inference 
that the defendant stole property in his possession may be 
drawn when "ja person in possession fails to make a satisfactory 
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While the Chambers instruction does not specify who must 
explain possession of stolen property, Instruction 19 in this 
case allows the jury to draw an inference when "_a person in 
possession fails to make £ satisfactory explanation of such 
possession. (Emphasis added.)" In clear and plain terms, this 
instruction called upon Mr. Branch to explain possession of the 
stolen property or allow the jury to infer it was stolen by his 
silence. 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
a jury instruction which stated that "The law presumes that a 
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary 
acts." ^d. at 415. As a threshold inquiry the Court noted 
that the ascertainment the constitutionality of such a jury 
instruction "requires careful attention to the words actually 
spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant has been accorded 
his constitutional rights depends upon the way which a 
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction." J^ d. 
at 514. 
In reversing Sandstrom1s conviction, the Court noted 
that since there was a reasonable possibility the jury might 
misinterpret the jury instruction the instruction was 
unconstitutional. I^ d. at 526. Here in plain terms the jury 
instruction requires "a person in possession" to explain how he 
came into possession of stolen goods. As such the jury could 
clearly have assumed Mr. Branch's failure to testify created, 
"by law," an inference he stole the jewelry in question. This Digitiz d by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cla k Law School, BYU. 
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802 (1952), "This notion basic in our law and rightly one of 
the boasts of a free society is a requirement and a safeguard 
of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 
due process." 
Consequently, in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, the 
Court determined that the government's burden applied to 
proving each and every element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt and any jury instruction which shifted that 
burden violated Due Process of law. Such a shift existed with 
regard to Instruction 19 in this case. 
As earlier noted, Instruction 19 indicated the jurors 
"may infer" stolen property in possession of the Appellant was 
stolen by him unless he explained differently. Although the 
instruction did not use the word "presumption," rather choosing 
"may infer," it still does not place the burden of proof with 
the State. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., defines "inference" 
as "a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition 
sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence 
from other facts, already proved or admitted." As such, the 
instruction told the jurors that once Mr. Branch was proven to 
have been in possession of the stolen jewelry they could infer 
he robbed the jewelry store without any further proof. Such an 
instruction clearly forced the Appellant to rebut the inference 
when he has no burden to produce any evidence. 
In the recent case of Francis v. Franklin, 
U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985) the Supreme Court considered a 
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POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED 
OF BOTH THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
AND THE INCLUDED OFFENSES OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT AND THEFT, 
Before trial, Mr. Branch's attorney filed a "Motion to 
Dismiss Counts II and III of Amended Information." (R. 
45-46)(Addendum E). The motion alleged that Count II, 
Aggravated Assault, and Count III, Theft, were actually lesser 
included offenses of Count I, Aggravated Robbery. The motion 
was heard by the trial court and denied (R. 
77,95-96,558-572,583). However, the trial judge expressed 
reservations concerning the theft charge (R. 583). After 
trial, the issue was again raised as part of the defendant's 
"Motion for Arrest of Judgment." (R.260-262,1705-1734). Again, 
the motion was denied (R. 263,1735). 
According to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(1953 as 
amended) a defendant in a criminal case "may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense." In other words, a defendant may be convicted of a 
lesser included offense as an alternative to conviction of the 
greater offense, but he may not be convicted of both the lesser 
and greater offenses. 
State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) is a case 
nearly identical to the present case. In Hill, the defendant 
robbed a hotel manager and guest at gunpoint. After the two 
victims were bound and gagged, the defendant took several items 
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of property and some cash. The defendant was subsequently 
c 1: i a r g e d w i t h a i i d c o i: i ii : t e d :»f f c \ i r :: r i n i < = s i i it :: 1 \ i d i r I g a g :j r a v a t e d :' 
robbery and theft. Ij3. at 97. On appeal, the defendant 
c o i 11 ended t h a t t he c on1 ? i c t i o n f or t heft was i mpr o pe r s i i I c e the' 
theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbe l y . 
In Hill
 f this Court cone] tided t .1 lat, i i l order t :o 
d e t e r m i n e i f a g r e a t E; I: ] e s s e r r e ] a t :i o n s 1 I :ii j: • < * x i s t s , a ' " • :; 
theoretica 1 c omp a r iso n of t he statu t o r y e1e me n t s of t he c r i mes 
j n questioi i is insufficient. XcL at 97. The cot irt must also 
coi Isider the evidence to determine whether a greater-1esser 
relationship exists, The Court then made such an examination 
• : • f the fact, E; ii i :t H x l ] ai I• :I 1: Ie] :1 t1 iat :i i: i 1:1 i.a t i nstai ice 11: Ieft was -.• 
indeed a l e s s e r , i n c 1 u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d robber y T h i I s , 
§76 -1-402{3) clearly barred convi cti on and punishment for bo11 i 
theft and aggravated robbery, 1^3. at: 98. •''.-.•' 
/, THE APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED 
OF THEFT. . , . . . 
Distingu: -» \\ -{ , -J * • s . . .possible with 
r e s p e c t ' <» ' l|i||i|f" a 1 . ' f i e s I nit \\ \\ i .i;. 
case, .:.-• Hill f t; * " '-;.-< s*t net >re the *.ry showed a 
complete d r o b b e r y w i t h the s t o r e f s p r o p e r t y taken f r o m i. ii e 
person of t .he employee, Joanne Knaphus, by the i lse oil: i 
firearm. The crime of tl left was part of that same criminal \. ;-
e p i s o d e U i i •• :ii = • r i d e n t i c a J c i r c urn s t a i I c e s t 1: I e Hi 1,,] C o l 11: I :':' '.' v 
concluded, "As to thi s variatior l of aggravated robbery, the • 
crime of theft i_s a ] esser ineluded offense.™ jrd. at 
(emphasis that :»f ori gina] ) 
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The only distinction between this case and Hill is 
that in Hill both crimes were alleged to have involved one 
victim. Here, the prosecutor (who was the same prosecutor as 
in Hill (R. 560)) charged the victim of the robbery was the 
employee, Joanne Knaphus, while the victim of the theft was 
alleged to be the store, Oakwood Jewelry (R.23-25). In fact, 
this difference in victims was merely a subterfuge on the part 
of the prosecution in an attempt to subvert Hill. Indeed, the 
perpetrators did not intend to rob Joanne Knaphus; they 
intended to rob the Oakwood Jewelry Store. Despite what the 
charging document alleges, the actual, intended victim of both 
the robbery and the theft was one and the same. Any other 
conclusion amounts to sheer fantasy. 
Hill is dispositive of this case and therefore, Mr. 
Branch's conviction of theft should be reversed and the 
sentence vacated. 
B. THE APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED 
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Mr. Branch was also convicted of aggravated assault 
which purportedly occurred against the person of a customer, 
Stella Kyarsgaard, who entered the store during the course of 
the robbery (R. 23-25,1210). At first appearance, this 
distinction would seem to remove the assault charge from the 
ambit of Hill. A closer inspection, however, reveals that Hill 
is still applicable. 
The two men who entered the store did so with the sole 
intention of robbing the store. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953 
as amended) requires that one who commits an offense act with Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the requisite mental state, T~ thi^ r s < - ^ , *-v»* commission of an 
ag :jravated assault required the act •• i ; ' ^ ' - n another , wi I :h 
the threat accompanied by a show of i i ni i: i« = •< ::iiiate foi : : e : • :n : i :>] < 2 <: e 
accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon,, Ui: .ah Code Ai in. •-,•. 
§ 7 6 5 ] 0 3 (] 9 5 3 a s a m € • i i d e d ) I l a g g r a i r „ a, i „ e d a s s a i i ] t , t h e i n t e i 11 
i s t o do s e r i o u s b od :i 1 y i n j u r y o r t o 11 I r ea t e n su ch i n j u r y b y 
the use of a deadly weapon, The :i ntent :i n an aggravated •-• : 
robbery is to take the proper ty :i i i J: ossess::i oi l • ::»f ai Io11: i E;I: b;y I :::I: :te 
IPe:ins of f o r c e < :)r fea:i: w::i 11 I t :. 1 Ie u s e of a d e a d l y w e a p o n . E v e r y 
a • i:. i • •' =! d i: o b b e r y i I e c e s s a r ii Il ] • ii i l • ::::i Jl i i d e s a n a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . 
In ti lis c a s e , M s . K y a r s g a a r d t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e ' •:• :•.:• ;^.-.-
voiuntaril y we n t t o t h e r e a i: o f t h e s t o r e ( R, 1 2.1 3 -1214 ) . A s 
she began to enter 11 I e r e a i : ai:ea ::> I: 11: i€ • s 1 oi:e
 i( ::> 1 ie testi fied 
that she was pushed from behi nd by an \ inarmed man whom she 
:ei Iu• :>i i :::>] ] ' :i deit 11 ii f::i e d a, 3 Ml:i: B r a n c I i ( R . •.••<.-'• '-• ' • • 
1215-4.217/3 22:6-] 228) In tl le real : < :»f the store, Ms. Kyarsgaard 
was escorted to a bathroom by a second man armed witi I a gun (R, 
1 2 ] 5 - ] 2 : .Jl 7 ) • - ; . . ' " : - • • • • • • • .' •  ' • • •••• -. ' . • • . ' " ' : . . - '.-•• • • • • ,- ' . . . • . . . - • • : ' 
The e v i d e n ce c1ear 1y indicates t ha t t he in t e nt of t h e 
'"•"i JC. tu d S S d U i i LMS. Kv-ir ^ oa : - f a-*,*-: _v 
effectuate jober^ m v assau. r * n 
c o m m i t t e d *.* n-jr-;.-> ' - i o r a v r , r o b b e r . *n^ t*'; )uld 
1
 * * UUlilt LO 
o .s * iuq- .vit'x obbery. 
The * denying ^ - ; M; " I t , • i 
-
 f
 t. h o s e r- ij • iH'i Xr • ; i ^  . * j v e r s e o a n • v •• *- ^r/.-^nce : r ic^ -^c. 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT. 
, 1 ..••.'. . . 
The Appellant was found guilty at trial of Aggravated 
Robbery, a felony of the first degree, with a firearm 
enchancement under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) 
and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended); Aggravated 
Assault, a felony of the third degree under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-103 (1953 as amended); and of theft, a felony of the 
second degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1953 as amended) 
(R. 23-25). He now argues that the prosecution produced 
insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions and therefore 
requests a reversal of those convictions. 
To convict Mr. Branch of the crimes charged above, the 
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to 
eliminate all reasonable doubts as to his innocence from the 
minds of the jurors. This basic standard is codified in Utah 
Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended), which states: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element 
of the offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of 
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice 
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with 
regard to sufficiency arguments, concluding 
This standard provides the basis for 
appellate review of a jury's verdict. 
While it is the sole province of the 
jury to assess the credibility of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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:.r=e var. • O U J .* ^  •  - ^Soes .v.-•] letarmi .:e 
the weight of the evidence, this 
Court must review the sufficiency 
of the evidence upon which the jury 
bases its final determination. If 
the evidence presented is so lacking 
that no reasonable person could conclude 
I* eliminates -i": 1 reasonable doubt of 
the defendant's guilt then we must 
aside the jury verdict. 
I_d at 232. 
Consequent!;- , • f H ie r e i -; if- • e a s o n a b l e v i - * f t '-.he 
•: "'.1 L - -'~ ' - . : • • -
innocence, i t wou1d fo] 1 ow that there wol 11 < I be reasonab1e 
cic • i ibts a s t• : I: I:l , s gI i:ii 1 1 1 1 I this case, since a 11 charges stem 
from a sing 1 e crimina1 episode , the prosecution must have 
proven that on or a be i it August 18 , 19 8 4 ,  Mr Branch either 
attempted t .c ::ort ti i: ii 1 : ! : r :> :>i in i t:i \ :ted t J: le :n : bber^ of Oakwoo* 3 J ewe] ry 
and that he committed or attempted to commit tl le robbery • 
i nten 1 :i oi Ia] ] ] :)i: I ;:nowi ng 1 ] ? with the use of a deadly weapon (R. 
1 4 7 ) . • • . . : ' - • • .. • . . . • ; • ; . . : 
This Court I: las addressed sufficiency of evidence 
requI i:ernei It => : i I i :tm ii: r i e i : o i Is •
 L ^ Petre, 
P , 2 d 4 4 3 (U t a h 19 8 3 ) , t h e *. n - i d e - - c - w r.«- - n e r t h e r -r 
sufficient evidence to sustai n a jui:y corivIcti on of the crin«-» 
of second degree murder, 1 11: petree c] aimed 11 Ie State f.<• . • J 
t o p r o v e h e " i n t e n t i o n a 11 y a n d k n o w i n g 1 y" c a u s e d t h e d e a t h o f 
tl: :ie 1;! ni ct :i i i: i . -. ., •. ' ^ •... • • . • . • 
In considering the appropriate standard of revi ew, 
this court stated, 
We reverse a jury
 C O n v i c t i o n for 
insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was con-
victed. State v. Kerekes, Utah 
662 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980); 
State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 
761, 762 (1979); State v. Daniels, 
Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (1978); 
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, 
219 (1976). 
Id. at 444. See Also: State v. Williams, 24 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1985). 
While recognizing that certain deference be granted to 
the jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that, 
In fulfillment of its duty to review 
the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will 
stretch the evidentiary fabric as 
far as it will go. But this does 
not mean that the court can take a 
speculative leap across a remaining 
gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
The evidence, stretched to its utmost 
limits, must be sufficient to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, State in re J.S.H., Utah, 642 P.2d 
386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980). 
Id. at 445. In the present case, the failure of the State to 
prove any essential element beyond a reasonable doubt means 
this Court must reverse. State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48,51 
(Utah 1983). 
Here the fabric woven by the prosecutor was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of Mr. Branch. There was 
no real evidence linking the Appellant to the scene of the 
crime. No fingerprints or pictures were presented. In fact, 
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t h e r o b b e r s l e f t t h e j e w e l r y s t o r e w i t h no c l u e s a s to t h e i r 
i • zlentiti e s - ' - .-.'- • ' .•' /'. . •[' • • v-: .•'''•' '.' .' : Y'. ; • •. "'"' : ' . 
The Oakwood employee who was robbed could not identi fy 
Mr Branch (R. 621/654,658) , and the onJ ;  r customer ii i the store 
I i 11 t i a 1 1 i :i d e i 11 i f :i e < :i A 3 1 e i i I) a v i • :i ] o 1 11 I s o i i a s t h e r :»b b e r a t t r i a ] 
(R. 1212 ) , Whi1e t h e c us t omer i dent i fi e d Pa u1 Br a nc h 1 a t e r in 
t h € 1 r :i a ] , r € : a i I t i i I g 1 I e r e a r J i e i: i d e i 11 i f i c a t i o r i ( R 1 2 0 7 4 J ) , 
her testimony was shown to be i nconsistent and unre1iab1e (See ; 
this brief at Point I B ) . ' ':':' ' 
A ] ] o t I: i« 2 r t e s 1 : :ii n to i i,} f r • : n: i < * y e w i 1 i i e s s e s • //1: i o i d e i I t i f i e d 
Mr. Branch at trial could only identify I liin, outside the store 
I i o .1 d i i i g a g a r b a g e b a g N c i I < 2 • :> f 11 i e s e e ] • e w i t n e s s e s c o \ 11 :I s t a t e . 
wh a t t he mai I c 1 a imed f: o be Br anch was ca r r y i ng (See t e s t imo ny 
of Marsha Wri gh t , R, 1 077 -J ] 2:5 ; .Misty Wr I g h t , R. ] 1 2 6 - ] 1 19 ; ; •-• 
L e s 1 i e Bi 11 ] < > i •, R J ] 5 0 - 1 16 5 , Me J ai: I I c • Mei e r s i, R 1 II 6 5 J ] 7 3 ; ' - • ' 
Daniel Williams, R ] ] 8 1 - 1 2 0 6 ) . in addition, the • • '•' 
i d e n t i f I, c a t i o i I s a n • :I ::i i s c r e p a n c :i e s o f e a c 1 I e y e w :i t n e s s w a s i i o t 
o n1y i n t er na 11y in c ons i s t e i I t, b ut a1s o inc o n s i s t e nt wit h th e 
descriptions and identifications of the other eyewitnesses (R. 
4 7 3 • 5 . " '.'. •'" ' '' '" '•' ' :"• ' ; h " •' l ' "' •' | 
Mr. Branch was also never provei I to be i n possession 
of the stolen jewelry (See this o r ^ t au ^ U I I I L III/. 
f a c t, • a t t r i a II t h e r e \ fa s f a r mo ' ° p v i d e n c p i- h a i- i m n 1 i o a+ : * 3 
Appellant's h a 1 f - b r o t h e r , J o e y v . • -. * r \ - v H <; -
 t 
B r a n c!: 1 C o • 3 e f e n d a n t P. ] ] e n J o h n - * - / 
Mi era was i n Ca lifornia pawni ng • - w * . * - ***'*'* r 
a n d n o t p a u l Branch (R. 1469,14b*,,-L4>a., . *hile personal 
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property belonging to Mr. Miera was found in the Pink Motel 
room ten with the stolen jewelry, no property belonging to Mr. 
Branch was discovered (See this brief at Point III). The room 
was not registered in Mr. Branch's name (R. 954-957), nor was 
there any property owned by him found in Raymond Johnson's car 
(R. 957). 
The arresting officers initially identified Mr. Miera 
as the man near the Pink Motel office, and Mr. Miera's picture 
was picked by the owner of the Valley Gold and Silver Exchange 
as possibly being the man who traded the stolen jewelry. The 
owner could not subsequently identify Mr. Branch during the 
trial (See this brief at Point III). 
When all this evidence is considered there is a 
considerable doubt that the Appellant committed the crime 
charged. This is especially true given that when Mr. Branch 
was arrested in Salt Lake City he was holding no jewelry or 
money, nor was any found in his automobile (R. 1397). Mr. 
Branch also presented the jury with evidence of an alibi (R. 
56). The Appellant's Aunt, Ms. Ruby Archuletta, testified 
under oath that Paul Branch was with her on the day of the 
Oakwood Jewelry Store robbery, helping move furniture (R. 
1371-1372). Ms. Archuletta testified she was sure of the date 
in question because it is the birthday of the Appellant's 
daughter, Tiffany (R. 1373,1376). 
Thus, for this Court to sustain the Appellant's 
conviction it must find the circumstantial evidence sufficient 
to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without taking a 
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"speculative ] eap" over gaps I n the evi dentiary fabric State v. 
Petree, 659 P 2d at 444 „ G:i ^  ) ei i that there was no real evidence 
p r o v i n g t h e i 3 e n t i t y o f t h e i: o b b e r s , t h i s C o u r t w :i ] ] b e h a r d 
p r e s s e d t o u p h o 1 d t h e c o n v i c t i o n. M r , Branch was neve i: f o u n d 
:i i I ]:: • o s s e s s :i :> i I c • f !: II: I = • j € • , «e • ] r i a i l ::i II: < = • p i: e s « ::; n t e d t: 1 I e j i i :i : ] , i 1 !: I =t 
ful 1 accoui it of his actions oi i the day of the crime. ••.•..•..• •..:•• 
Furthermore, vast amounts of ev idence tended to show ti le robber 
might h a v e been J o e y M i e r a, h a 1 f - b r o t h e i: o f 11 I - : » A p p e J 1 a n t. 
Since there- . .* ^jie than reasonable doubt as to the guilt of 
Mr Br an< ; er di :::t s 1 ic: i i] ::i b e i:e1 rer sed." ' ' "•. '; .' •:•.'• - •' • 
• • P O I N T V I , ' - • • '. '•*• '"•••' \ 
rH£ T R I A L C Q U R T E R R E D IN D E N Y I N G THE " 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT VI 
OF THE INFORMATION CHARGING APPELLANT 
UNDER HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE 
:i.:i '] • 25 1 985 P. u ill Brai u il: i 
co
}
:~
u
 *- ?• d i i v. i s s c o u n t IV o f t h e I n f o r ma t i o; * c . JI 'i.na f *: \ \ 
b e i n g a ha b i 11 i a J c r I m I n a 1 u n der U t a h Co de A' • n. V : b - b - i b u i < ,
 ; J 
a s amende : rhe s t a t u t e p e r m i t s Ident::i fi ca:...,, ,.. , . .J convic i . >n 
of ; i a b i t u a I c r I m i n a 1 s as fo11owsi 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a crime 
which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison, may, upon conviction 
of at least a felony murder in the first or 
second degree, be determined as a habitual 
criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison 
for from five years to 1 i fe, 
s il: • :::) i: I : t II: :i e s t a t I i t e i: e < j i i :i r e s t h e s t a t e •, i i p o n 
o b t a i r i n *. <i £ i r s t o r s e c o n d d e g r e e f e 1 o i: I y c o n v i c t i o n, t o Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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present evidence of two other felony convictions which resulted 
in sentencing and commitment. In the case at bar, the 
prosecution actually presented evidence of three past 
convictions, each of which apparently resulted in commitment. 
The convictions were for Unlawful Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substance in 1973; for Aggravated Robbery, a first 
degree felony, in 1975; and for Attempted Escape, a third 
degree felony in 1983. The evidence of the Attempted Escape 
conviction, sentencing, and commitment in January 1983 
consisted of Appellant's signed affidavit proving that he 
entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and 
indicating that he was committed to Utah State Prison. (R. 
1740, exhibit 3-S) . The evidence of the Unlawful Distribution 
for Value of a Controlled Substance conviction, sentencing, and 
commitment in October, 1973 consisted of judicially-issued 
commitment orders and a court record of Appellant's entry of a 
guilty plea (not an affidavit signed by Appellant) (R. 1736, 
exhibit 4-S). The 1975 Aggravated Robbery conviction, 
sentencing and commitment were proved with a certified copy of 
Mr. Branch's file indicating the date of his commitment and 
containing receipts from the sheriff and prison officer showing 
that Mr. Branch was delivered and received at the prison (R. 
1736, Exhibit 2-S). 
In summary, only one of the three prior convictions 
was substantiated with a signed affidavit tending to prove that 
Mr. Branch entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. 
Appellant brought a motion to dismiss the habitual criminal 
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charge on the basis that tl: le state had failed to meet the 
previous feiorn- ;on , ,cl i ^-.: :t- .-oc-t nsmissed trie mot ion, 
finding Appellant gin 1 t-y vo cna^yed andc. oounc x'v of the 
Appellant contends that - 1 -. ^ "i -t^it err 
charge and urges thi^ cou? = ;over^e ; .3 conviction u.ioer 
that charge Pole '-."••• • *•' -he Rules -->f ^ -'Tact ice • t he 01. str 
requirements ;• n regar :; to gui • t \ p l.-.-—• 
upon encry 01 u piea or gunny c . 01 i::;i:^  :. 
charge, before acceptance thereof, there HHJ; - *: 
be substantial compliance with the follow: • 
Admonitions to Defendant, 
The Court shall not accept a piea 01 
guilty without first making certain that 
defendant understands the following: 
1. The nature of the charge. 
;. rhe iiu n i.-Tiiin ..no oaximum sentence 
prescribed by law, including, when 
applicable, the penalty to which 
the defendant may be subjected, 
including anv rcn.se-. ;r::v^  t^ntencep, 
if given; 
3. That Le- defendant has the 
right to plead not guilty, or to 
persist in that plea if it has 
already been made, or to plead 
guilty; and 
4. That if he pleads guilty there 
will not be a trial of any kind, so 
.-•-.•• .c • •' that by pleading guilty he waives 
the right to a trial by jury, the 
right to be confronted with the 
.;••"•'•. witnesses against hint, the right 
against self incrimination, and the 
right to appeal a conviction, 
b Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary, 
te; The court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first determining that the plea 
.-is voluntary, If the tendered plea i s Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the result of a plea agreement, the 
agreement shall be stated and confirmed 
in open court. The court shall determine 
whether any force of threats or any 
promises, apart from a plea agreement, 
were used to obtain the plea. 
c. Determining Factual Basis for Plea. 
The court shall not enter final judgment 
on a plea of guilty without first deter-
mining that there is a factual basis for 
the plea, and that all requirements of 
law for acceptance of guilty plea have 
been met. 
d. Use of Affidavit of Defendant. 
The Court may establish the foregoing 
requirements in the record by use of 
a written affidavit executed by the 
defendant before the court, the substance 
of which shall be substantially the 
form as contained in the "Affidavit of 
Defendant" form. 
The use of an affidavit of the defendant is 
discretionary with the trial court under subsection (d) of 
this statute. Appellant argues that the execution of the 
affidavit should be mandatory; in any event, he argues that 
equivalent means were not resorted to prove that his guilty 
pleas were knowing and voluntary in the 1973 and 1975 
convictions. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a guilty plea, in order 
to be valid, must be accompanied by an affirmative showing that 
it was intelligently and voluntarily entered. The Court 
required specifically that the trial court accept guilty pleas 
only after determining that the accused is voluntarily, 
knowingly waiving his rights to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination, to demand a trial by jury, and to confront 
his accusers. Appellant in the case at bar argues that Utah 
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new conviction was based, failed to show that the defendant was 
represented by counsel or had knowingly and intelligently 
waived the right to counsel. 
The Washington Court of Appeals held in a 1981 case 
that when using a prior conviction to prove an accused's 
habitual criminal status, the state has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood the nature of the 
offense and the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. 
Chervenell, 626 p.2D 530 (Ct. App. Wash. 1981). In Chervenell, 
the state introduced a "Statement of Defendant on Plea of 
Guilty" form to prove defendant entered his plea voluntarily. 
However, the court was not prepared to assume without further 
evidence that the signature had been affixed in full 
understanding of the contents of the form. I_d. at 532. 
These cases show that the state must not only 
demonstrate the existence of prior convictions but must also 
show the validity of those convictions. Mr. Branch is asking 
this Court to reverse his conviction on Count IV of the 
Information against him because the state did not meet its 
burden of providing an adequate basis for the trial court to 
find that Appellant's guilty pleas in two of three prior felony 
convictions were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The clear 
implication of Saunders, Burgett, and Chervenell is that 
something in the nature of a Boykin affidavit signed by 
defendant and counsel is essential to prove a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea. Such an affidavit was introduced as 
evidence of only one of the three prior felony convictions; 
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consequently, Appellant asks the Court to reverse his 
conviction under Utah Code Ann, §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended), 
POINT VII 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS WARRANTS 
REVERSAL OF MR, BRANCH'S CONVICTION, 
In his final point, Mr. Branch argues his conviction 
should be reversed because the cumulative effect of errors in 
the trial below deprived him of his right to a fair trial 
before an impartial jury. The doctrine of "cumulative error" 
refers to a number of errors which prejudice a defendant's 
right to be tried in a fair manner. State v. Close/ 623 P.2d 
940, 948 (Mont. 1981). 
The Appellant concedes that in the absence of 
prejudice there is no reversible error. State v. Phelps, 696 
P.2d 447, 454 (Mont. 1985); State v. Hoxsie, 677 P.2d 620,623 
(N.M. 1984); State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333,336 (Utah 1980). 
However courts have the responsibility to ensure that a 
defendant receives a just trial and any conviction obtained in 
a proceeding in which the cumulative impact of irregularities 
is so prejudicial to a defendant that he is deprived of that 
right must be reversed. State v. Martin, 686 P.2d 937,943 
(N.M. 1984). Reversal is required even though no one of the 
errors standing alone warrants a reversal, state v. Thomas, 
636 P.2d 807,814 (Kan. C. of A. 1981). This is true even if 
the errors are procedural in nature. People v. Hemrick, 624 
P.2d 1333, 1338 (Colo. C. of A. 1979). 
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While there is no established test to determine when 
errors in a trial warrant a reversal, courts generally view the 
circumstances of the entire trial. State v. Williams, 682 P.2d 
660, 669 (Kan. 1984). Factors which are generally weighed are 
the closeness of guilt or innocence, the quantity and character 
of the errors, and the gravity of the crime charged. Big Pond 
v. State, 692 P.2d 1288 (Nev. 1985). Underlying each of these 
factors is the "supervisory function of the appellate court in 
maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the 
end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial." 
Weakland v. State, 615 P.2d 252,254 (Nev. 1980). 
A review of the record in this case reveals that the 
evidence was not overwhelming. In fact, by the end of the 
trial, there was considerable doubt as to the whether or not 
the robber was Appellant's half-brother, Joey Miera, a man who 
closely resembles the Appellant (See Addendum B). There was 
actually more evidence implicating Mr. Miera than there was 
implicating the Appellant. 
The record reveals that there was no direct evidence 
introduced against the Appellant such as fingerprints and no 
photographs. When the Appellant was arrested, he had no 
jewelry on his person or in his car (R. 1397). Rather than 
having a large amount of money in his possession, Mr. Branch 
was carrying only small change (R. 1397). In addition, Mr. 
Branch, in his defense, was able to account for all of his 
actions on the day of the crime through an alibi (R. 1370). 
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While there were witnesses who identified Mr. Branch 
as being at the crime scene, the circumstances of their viewing 
were such that their reliability is questionable. The only 
witness to view the suspect in the jewelry store actually 
mis-identified the codefendant, David Allen Johnson as the 
robber at trial, later recanting her identification (R. 
1212-1228). Given that the two men look nothing alike, one can 
only doubt the reliability of the witness1 identification of 
Mr. Branch. 
While the record reveals that other witnesses claimed 
to have viewed Mr. Branch at the Oakwood Jewelry Store, the 
circumstances surrounding the incident show that the robber was 
wearing dark sunglasses and a hat to conceal his identity (R. 
1212-1218), with no witness getting a clear view of the 
suspectfs face. Given that the Appellant and Mr. Miera closely 
resemble each other, except as to height, one can only wonder 
which man was really involved in the crime. 
Other testimony and evidence which was considered at 
trial tended to implicate Mr. Miera rather than the Appellant. 
Two Los Angeles Police Officers who identified Mr. Branch as 
being in the Pink Motel parking lot on the day substantial 
amounts of jewelry were recovered initially claimed it was Mr. 
Miera they saw and not the Appellant (R. 1035-1037,1059-1062, 
953-955). In addition, personal items belonging to Joey Miera 
were found in Room ten of the motel while nothing was found 
which belonged to Mr. Branch. Indeed, the officers conceded 
that no proof existed which tied the Appellant to either the 
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Pink Motel or to the shop where the jewelry was pawned (R. 
954-957) . 
Even more revealing was the testimony by codefendant 
David Alan Johnson that Mr. Branch did not accompany the group 
to California (R. 1469,1482,1491). Rather, Johnson testified 
that it was Joey Miera who brought the jewelry to be pawned and 
not Mr. Branch. Indeed, the pawn broker where the jewelry was 
sold was able to select a picture of Mr. Miera as possibly 
being one of the men who sold the jewelry shortly after the 
sale (R. 955-956). That same broken however, could not make an 
identification of Mr. Branch at trial (R. 1370). 
Thus, in reviewing the closeness of guilt or innocence 
one can only wonder about the reliability of the Appellantfs 
conviction. Rather than being overwhelming, the state's case 
actually produced more evidence implicating Joey Miera than it 
produced implicating the Appellant. 
The second consideration of this court here is the 
quantity and character of the errors in the trial below. Here 
again there is much to lead to the conclusion that Mr. Branch 
was not given a fair trial. 
Error began with the trial court refusing to sever the 
cases of the three codefendants. As a result, the Appellant 
was tried with the defendants who were found in possession of 
amounts of stolen jewelry, none of which could be tied to the 
Appellant. Indeed, the testimony at trial dealing with the 
recovery of stolen jewelry covered hundreds of pages while only 
extremely limited testimony actually involved the Appellant. 
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Given that there was no proof that Mr. Branch was even in the 
State of California, such testimony was clearly irrelevant to 
his case. The possibility that Mr. Branch was convicted by 
association in trial with the Johnson brothers is a very real 
prospect that cannot be ignored. Tried separately, attention 
would have been focused on the questionable testimony of the 
Los Angeles Police Officers and not on the recovery of the 
stolen property since Mr. Branch was never found in possession 
of any jewelry. 
The impact of the trial court's error is further 
magnified by Instruction 19, which was given to the jury. It 
indicated that someone in possession of recently stolen 
property who is unable to explain such possession may be 
presumed to have stolen that property. Such an instruction, 
already discouraged by this Court, should have never been 
applied to the Appellant. 
The record is remarkably clear that at no point is Mr. 
Branch ever found in possession of stolen jewelry. The 
officers who testified that they saw the Appellant did not see 
him in room ten. Rather, the officers testified that the man 
they eventually believed to be Mr. Branch was found near the 
front office (R. 695). Cross-examination by defense counsel 
further revealed that the motel room where the jewelry was 
found was not registered to Mr. Branch (R. 348) nor was there 
any evidence indicating the Appellant had been near the 
jewelry. Given the uncontradicted testimony, how could the 
trial court ever have concluded that the presumption 
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instruction could apply to the Appellant, who was never found 
in possession of jewelry? 
Even worse, the trial court further compromised Mr. 
Branch's right to a fair trial by allowing the officers to 
testify they saw Mr. Branch at the Pink Motel when the 
reliability of that testimony was clearly questionable. The 
officers saw this unidentified man for only a few seconds and 
under circumstances that were incriminating at best. This 
unidentified man was doing nothing illegal at the time the 
officers drove past, and the officers1 attention was directed 
toward ongoing illegal activity at the other end of the motel. 
Any question about the reliability of the 
identifications could be answered by the fact that the officers 
initially identified the man in the lot as being Joey Miera. 
Indeed, it wasn't until the preliminary hearing, held months 
later, that the officers changed their story to identify Mr. 
Branch (R. 454-455). 
Under such tenuous circumstances the trial court 
should have excluded the identifications as being unreliable 
but did not. The trial court might have still protected Mr. 
Branch by allowing jury instruction which explained the limits 
and dangers of eyewitness identifications. Yet, again the 
trial court refused, leaving the Appellant unprotected and 
vulnerable to injustice. When viewed along with the failure to 
dismiss Aggravated Assault and Theft charges as lesser included 
offenses which had the effect of charge stacking and unduly 
prejudicing the Appellant before the jury, the mention of drugs 
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and syringes and the misidentification of Mr. Branch at trial 
one wonders how he could have not been convicted. At no point 
did that trial court ever act in a manner consistent with the 
ideal that Mr. Branch be given a fair trial. 
The final consideration is the gravity of the offense 
charged. Here again this Court will view circumstances in 
favor of reversing the conviction below. While the Appellant 
was convicted of a serious crime, the record reveals he was 
unarmed during the alleged robbery and that he never harmed 
those in the store during the crime. In determining the 
sentence, even the trial court noted that the Appellant was an 
upstanding young man with an excellent chance at rehabilitation 
(R. 1781-1782). 
In viewing the circumstances of Mr. Branch's trial, 
one must conclude that prejudicial error was committed. It has 
always been understood that public support for a system of 
justice depends not only on the capacity of that system to 
render justice in fact, but also on its ability to protect the 
parties in an image of fairness. As stated by Justice Traynor 
in R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, 20, 22 (1970): 
[T]he litigant has a right to objective 
consideration of all proper evidence by 
triers of fact without violations of any 
substantial rights he may have a a litigant. 
He is entitled not to a trial free of all 
possible error but to a trial free of harmful 
error. 
. . . [W]here the error is so forceful as to 
leave its mark on the judgment, the trial itself 
[is] contaminated. An appellant whose right to 
a fair trial in a trial court has been vitiated 
should be accorded that right anew. Retrial is a 
small price to pay for insuring the right to a 
• F a - i K f - r - i a l 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the Appellant was charged with and convicted 
of Aggravated Robbery as well as Theft and Aggravated Assault, 
lesser, included offenses the Appellant requests that this 
Court reverse his conviction and vacate the sentences for the 
lesser offenses. Because the Appellant's conviction of being a 
habitual criminal was constitutionally infirm, the Appellant 
requests that this Court reverse that conviction and remand for 
either further proceedings or dismissal of the charge. Because 
Appellant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery, Theft, and 
Aggravated Assault were tainted by numerous errors, the 
Appellant requests that this Court reverse those convictions 
and remand either for a new trial or dismissal of the charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "N / day of April, 1986. 
-a^yjb /jJll^J 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CfiRISTOPH/E H IST P R KERECWAN 
Attorney for Apgfellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellant',. .^ r-ipf wi 1 ] be delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake ^ , )4114 this / day of Ap):il )86. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
T*: MVERED 
day of April, 1986. 
this 
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i I? 
BROOKE C. WELLS (#3421) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
foe 31 2S0WM 
DEPUrTOLERK £ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN-COURT 
IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. CR-84-1266 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
COMES NOW the Defendant, PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, by and 
through his attorney of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves the 
Court for an Order suppressing any in-court identifications of 
Defendant Branch by prosecution witnesses. Defendant's trial 
is scheduled to begin on January 15, 1985. This Motion is made 
on the grounds that previous identifications of Defendant Branch 
by prosecution witnesses have been so suggestive and unreliable 
as to render future possible identifications excludable under 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and in violation of Defendant's 
constitutional rights prohibiting abuse of due process: 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jj>£) day of December, 1984. 
LJd^^^ 
BROOKECVWELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this J>/ day of December, 1984, 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Joe Fratto, Jr. Attorney 
431 South Third East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
o i 
this /*>/ day cf December, 1984. 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Ed Brass, Attorney, 
321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 3 / day of 
December, 1984. 
-2-
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3~?A3/ 
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH 
a 5-3-1-n-4-i T80 
^A 
JOEY MIERA 
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NO OBJECTION 
JUDGE: You may be excused, thank you mame 
(SIDE B MARK 25) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
HOUSELY: Will you state your full name please 
A: Stella Kyarsgaard 
Q: Will you spell your last name 
A: Kyarsgaard 
Q: Is it Mrs. Kyarsgaard 
A: Yes 
Q: Mrs. Kyarsgaard on August 18, 1984, where were you employed 
A: At the chesse and wine cellar 
Q: Where is that located 
A: Hillside Plaza 
Q: Do you know where the Oakwood Jewelry store was located at 
that time 
A: Yes I did 
Q: Where was the place of your employment from that store 
A: 50 yards maybe 
Q: The same side of the street 
A: No kitty corner 
Q: On that day did you have occasion to go into the Oakwood Jewelry 
store 
A: Yes I did 
Q: About what time did you go in 
A: About 5:10 approximately 
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0: Was that the first time you had been in there on that date 
A: No I went in earlier to, to take my rings in to be cleaned 
0: O.K. did you, did you know the person that was in there when 
you did that 
Yes 
Who was it. 
It was Bob, no it wasn't Bob it was Jo Anne 
Jo Anne was in there 
Yes 
Did you leave your rings there 
Yes I did 
Alright, uh, when you went in about 5:10 was there anyone 
in there^  
Yes 
How many people were in there 
One that I saw 
Okay what happened as you entered the store 
Well I entered the store and this man was on the right hand 
side of the showcase, I didn't know who he was so I just looked 
over and he shouted something to somebody in the backroom, which 
I thought he said Bob and I said I will carry on, I will go back 
so I went back and that's when I 
Q: What happened when you got to the back 
A: Well I thought something wasn't quite right so I was going 
to change my mind and come back out and he pushed me and then 
came out of the bathroom and grabbed me 
0: Okay and the person that went, there was a second person in 
the back 
A: Yes. there was 
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0: Was that male too 
A: Yes 
0: And thatf s the one that you thought the other one called Bob 
A: Correct 
Q: Did you see whether that other person in the back had anything 
in his hands 
A: Yes he had a gun 
Q: Did you see the gun 
A: Yes I did 
0: Did you see where the gun was pointed 
A: It seemed like it was pointed at me 
Q: Can you give me a description of that gun 
A: Silver, silver looking, small, a small gun and black handle, 
I can't say it was a black handle, I didn't see the handle, black 
dial and a silver, like a small silver gun 
Q: Do you know the difference between a hand gun and a rifle 
or a shotgynn 
A: Yes I do 
Q: Which would you call this 
A: It was a small handgun 
Q: Do you know the difference between an automatic and a revolver 
A: No I don't
 :, 
Q: Did that person who was in the back say anything to you 
A: Yes he said don't look at me 
Q: Anyting else 
A: Well I stood in the corner, they put me in the corner there 
and I stood in the corner 
Q: In the bathroom 
A: In the bathroom yes and Jo Anne was already in the toilet 
0: What happened then 
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on George, what's taking you so long 
Q: By he do you mean the person that was back by the bathroom 
A: The one that was in the bathroom with us 
Q: He called the other on George 
A: Yes 
Q: Okay and then what happened 
A: Well then a long time seemed to go by and I am trying to think, 
oh he said I won1t hurt you 
Q: He said I won't hurt you 
A: Yes I won't hurt you 
Q: Okay what else 
A: He said stay here, we are leaving he said stay for 10 minutes 
in the bathroom he said, if you move he said there is a man out 
in the car that has a gun and we will use it. 
Q: Okay then what happened 
A: Well then he came out and then a couple of seconds later he 
barged back in and said who set the alarm off 
Q: Then what happened 
A: Then they left 
Q: Okay did Jo Anne set the alarm off 
A: Yes 
Q: Did the police come ultimately 
A: Very quickly yes 
Q: Had you ever seen either of those two persons before, the 
A: No Sir 
Q: Will you give us a decription 
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A: I can only give you a slight one of the one that was in the 
bathroom because I didn't see his face, but the one in the showcase 
Q: Did you see the face of the one in the showcase 
A: Well he had glasses on so it is a little difficult 
Q: O.k. 
A: He was mexican, dark hair, glasses on, sunglasses, moustache 
Q: Can you tell me anything else about him 
A: Nope 
0: Did you see the man's hands that was by the showcase, down 
behind the showcase 
JUDGE: Will you answer yes or no please 
A: Oh lam sorry, no 
PROSECUTOR: Yes lam sorry you do have to 
A: I am sorry 
0: Articulate your answers because it is being recorded through 
the microphone. Did uh, what did you see of the man that was 
back by the bathroom when you got back there 
A: Well he looked very tall 
0: I am sorry 
A: He looked tall 
Q: Okay taller than you 
A: Oh yes 
Q: How tall are you 
A: 5'2" 
Q:0kay do you recall what size shoe, whether you were wearing 
high heeled shoes or flat shoes 
A: I was wearing flat shoes, because I wear flat shoes for work 
Q: Can you tell us approximately how tall the man in the back 
was 
A: I don't know what to say, 5'10" or 11" Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A: No 
0: Would you be able to recognize either of those two men again 
if you saw them 
(Mark 30) 
A: I think I would recognize the one that I saw 
Q: Arid that's which one 
A: The small dark one that was there when I entered the room 
Q: Will you look around the room and tell me if you see either 
of those men here in this room 
A: That man with the 
Q: Will you step down and touch the man that you are referring 
to 
A: Sure 
0: Alright you can retake the stand 
JUDGE: Let the record reflect that the witness has touched Mr. 
Paul Anthony Branch 
PROSECUTOR: Is that the person, which of the two men is it that 
you have just identified 
A: The one that was in the showcase 
Q: The one you saw at first 
A: Yes 
Q: How positive are you of your identification 
A: May I looke at him and study 
0: Sure 
A: Oh I think I am very positive 
Q: Would you be able to recognize the gun again if you saw it 
A: Yes 
0: Let me show you what's been marked 
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TAPE #5SL8458 
PRELIMINARY HEARING: (Continued) 
STATE v. PAUL BRANCH et. al. Case No. 84 FS 2147 
Q: I!ll show you the contents of a envelope that has been 
marked Exhibit P13 and I111 ask you to look at that and tell me if 
you recognize that item. 
A: I thought it was a little different than that. 
0: In what way? 
A: Pearly, I thought this was pearly. 
Q: When you said I thought this was like pearly, you were rubbing 
on the frame part of the metal frame rather than the round part. Is 
that right? 
A: Yes 
NB: Hold it up so we know what we are talking about. Thanks, would 
you have her testify again as to what she was referring to. 
Q: When you were describing a part of the gun that you saw that 
you thought was pearly, which, would you point to the part on this gun? 
The frame part of the gun. 
JV: Is that the cylinder of the frame 
Q:Well, let me ask you this. If this thing that turns here, is 
the cylinder and this thing that turns here is the barrel and the 
frame, which part are you referring to as the part that you thought was 
pearly? 
A: The front part seems to be missing a piece, I donft know. 
I!m sorry, but I!m not very well.. 
0: If it is alright, Your Honor, I will close the gun and maybe 
it will make it possible to look at it a little better. Alright, does 
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A: Oh yes. 
JUDGE: Please don't put your finger on the trigger. It is not loaded, 
but I still would appreciate it if you didn't. 
A: It shows you how much I know about them. I can't really, I can't 
say. It is the same size. It is a little one. 
Q: Is it the same style? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Why did you go into the bathroom ? 
A: Because I was pulled into the bathroom. 
Q: Was that the only reason? 
A: Yes 
Q: Why did you wait in the bathroom? 
A: Because he had a gun. 
Q: What effect did that have on you ? 
A: Well, it is rather frightening. 
Q: That is all of the questions I have Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION: (N. Bergeson) 
Q: I am going to call you Stella. 
A:That is fine. 
Q: Now, as you came into the store you didn't see JoAnn did you? 
A: No. 
0: The only person that you saw was an individual over by the 
showcase. 
A: Uh huh. 
Q: I want you to turn around if you will, there is a diagram there 
to the left. That proports to be a layout of the store. Do you 
recognize that? 
A: Uh huh. 
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A: Really good. 
0: Alright, would you please indicate with an "S" no just put "D" 
where you saw the individual by the showcase when you first came in. 
(witness is marking the diagram) 
Q: Alright, that person was then behind the showcase. 
A: Yes. 
JUDGE: Did you put a "D" there? 
E. Jones: Well, she made a mark. 
A: That was supposed to be a "D". 
Q: Now was that person bent over when you saw him first? 
A: Yes, he was, yes. 
0: Alright, and as you walked in, did that individual notice 
your presence? 
A: Oh yes. 
0: Was it at that point that the individual turned and yelled 
something toward the back of the store, right? 
A: Well, I walked over there and looked and then that was when 
he shouted somthing to 
Q: You think he shouted somthing like Bob? 
A: I think that was what he shouted, Hey Bob, that was why I 
went back there. 
Q: Alright, immediately you walked to the back of the store. 
Did you go through the door into the back office area? 
A: No. I was pushed from about here. Pushed and he grabbed me 
(inaudible) into the bathroom. 
Q: Okay, as you began to walk to the back of the store, what was 
the first thing that you saw? 
A: As I walked to the back of the store? 
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A: No, I didn!t see anybody back there. 
0: So when was it then that you first saw the individual in the 
back of the store. 
A: When his arm came out and grabbed me and pulled me into the 
0: The arm came from the back office area or the bathroom? 
A: The bathroom. 
Q: So you had entered into the back office area then? 
A: Yeah, I was walking back here. Pushed back there I should say. 
Q: Alright, you are saying you were pushed, he is the one who pushed 
you into the back office area? 
A: Uh huh. 
0: Did JoAnn say anything to you at that time? 
A: No. 
Q: You said that an arm came and pushed you, whose arm was that? 
A: The man that was in the bathroom. 
0: Alright, and that man was in the bathroom at the time. 
A: Oh yes, he was in there. 
0: Jo Ann didn't say anything to you? 
A: NO 
0: Okay, and when you went into the bathroom or were pushed into 
the bathroom, where exactly in the bathroom did you go? 
A: Where did I go once I got in there? 
Q: What part of the bathroom did you go? 
A: Uh, he said don't look at me, he said. 
Q: Right. 
A: Right? 
A: And then into the corner I went 
Q: Would you put an "S" in the corner in which you were in in the 
bathroom. 
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A: I am trying to find the bathroom, that is what is difficult. 
0: You recognize where the bathroom is? 
A: No, I donft really I know it is in the back here. 
0: Now, you see in the 
A: Right here. 
Q: Right. Where is the door to the bathroom? 
A: Right here. 
Q: Alright, if the whole corner there, the whole box area 
is the bathroom, see where it is labeled bathroom. Alright, and 
the mark that you just put it is extended out past the red mark. 
If that is the swinging door, then 
A: This is the door in the bathroom. 
0: Alright, let me give you the frame of reference of this drawing. 
The person who drew it before said that the door was the black line that 
extends out to the first mark you make . Alright, lets assume just in 
order to get your testimony correct, lets assume that is the door, 
where were you in relation to the door? Were you behind it , over in 
the corner 
A: I was in the corner. 
0: Alright, show me again where you were. 
A: This is the door to the bathroom here, - "\ • v • 
NB: Your Honor, may I approach the witness to help clarify this. 
JUDGE: Why don't you just have her draw a bathroom. 
NB: Alright, why don't you just draw the bathroom. 
A: Alright very well, now here is the door. Here is where I was, 
in this corner. 
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0: Alright, where was Jo Ann as you were in that corner? 
A: She was here on the toilet. 
Q: She was sitting on the toilet? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Is there one toilet? 
A: Yes, one. 
Q: Alright, and was the door closed during that period of time? 
A: No. He stood in the doorway. 
Q: Were you able to see the tall individual that you have described 
during that period of time? 
A: No, I din1t even look. 
Q: Where was tha person as far as you could tell 
A: As far as I know, here was Jo Ann and he was here. 
0: There was nothing then that precluded you to have seen that 
person in the bathroom. 
A: Except for me turning around and having a look. 
Q: Alright, you didn't want to look at him? 
A: No I didn't 
Q: But he was right there in the bathroom? 
A: Oh Yes. 
Q: Now as he was talking in the bathroom, he was carrying on a 
converation with Jo Ann? 
A: No. 
0: He was talking to the individual out 
A: Outside. 
Q: Did he move and walk outside of the bathroom? 
A: I don1t know. 
Q: You don't recall. Did you hear his voice the whole time? 
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A: Yes, he was shouting to the fellow. 
Q: Do you think you could recognize that voice again if you 
heard it? 
A: Oh, I don't know. I really don't know. I hate to say this but 
everybody sounds alike. 
Q: How long of period of time did you hear him talk to the other 
individual? 
A: Five or ten minutes, five, something like that. 
Q: Was it, how long was it from the time that you were first put 
into the bathroom from the time that you said Jo Ann went to pull 
the alarm? 
A: Oh, twenty minutes maybe, I don't know, time just. I would 
say, to me, it seemed like twenty minutes or something like that. 
Q: Now, you have described generally that individual that was 
back in the bathroom. You said that that person was 5'10" or 5!11". 
A: Taller anyway, yeah. 
Q: You think the person was tall. Now are you married. 
A: Well, I am divorced. 
Q: How tall was your husband? 
A: 6'2". 
Q: Would you say that that individual was as tall as your husband? 
A: No. 
Q: How much shorter than your husband was he ? 
A: He was shorter, that I do know How many, I couldn't tell. How 
many inches. 
Q: Do you think he could have been 6'? 
A: Could have been. 
Q: Do you recall now what that individual was wearing? 
A: No. 
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A: Uh huh. 
JUDGE: Now, which individual are we talking about? 
NB: We are talking about the individual back in the bathroom. 
A: Oh, the one I described was the one up front. 
Q: Alright, then I will take you back. We are talking about the 
person who was in the bathroom. Now you did say that person was tall. 
Right? 
A: Yes. Appeared tall. 
Q: Very tall? 
A: He appeared tall and thin, from what I can gather. 
Q: Tall and thin? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: But you canft recall what that person was wearing? 
A: No. 
Q: You can recall, though, that the person had on dark glasses? 
A: That was the front person. 
Q: Alright, now I am just talking about the person in the bathroom. 
A: The bathroom, okay. 
Q: Do you recall anything else about that person? 
A: No. 
Q: Not whether they had glasses on, or a hat on. 
A: No, when he said don't look at me, I didn't look. 
Q: So you didn't look at that person at all, even for a instant? 
A: No. 
Q: Uh, you have described the gun. Do you know what the barrel 
is, the part that points out. 
A: Just the end of it, right. 
Q: How long would you say, based on your own memory, how long would 
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Q: Do you think something pearly was on that gun? 
A: It seemed to me to be a white gun, a white front on it. That 
was what I was trying to think of. Rather than a metal. But I only 
caught a glimpse, so I don't know. 
Q: Now you recall talking to the police officers in this case. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you told them exactly what you observed and what you 
remembered at the time. 
A: Uh huh. 
Q: You gave them as much detail as you possibly could at the time 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: Do you recall telling them anything about the race of the person back 
in the bathroom? 
A: No. 
Q: Nothing ? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you recall giving them any detail about that person at all. 
A: No I don1t. 
Q: You did gi'^ e them the height though? 
A: Oh yes, because that was all I saw. 
Q: You looked at some photo arrays? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How much later after this occurred did you look at the photo 
arrays? 
A: I am trying to think, maybe a week. 
Q: Was it only one time that you looked at a photo array? 
A: No twice. 
Q: Two different times? -
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A: Uh, huh. 
Q: When was the second time? 
A: My memory, uh, at the end of the week, give or take. 
Q: Do you recall who was present when you looked at those photo-
graphs? 
A: Yes I do. 
Q: Alright, who was it? 
A: Urn, (inaudible) 
Q: Uh huh, anybody else? 
A: Oh, I don't think, Ifm not sure if the man was with him or not. 
The one with the glasses on. Now, was alone the second time. 
Q: Okay, the first time he was with somone else. 
A: Yes, the other man was with him only. 
Q: Did they show you those photographs at your home? 
A: No. 
Q: Where were you? 
A: I came outside from the shop. 
Q: Was JoAnn around at the time? 
A: No 
Q: Were any other people around who saw? 
A: No, just me and 
Q: Were you able to identify anybody the first time you were showed 
a photo array? 
A: Not the first time, no. 
Q: But the second time you were. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Can you recall how many pictures were in that photo array the 
second time? 
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Q: How many pictures were you shown? 
PROS: Which time are we talking about, the first or second time? 
NB: The second time. 
A: Five or six. 
Q: Five or six? And how were they shown to you, were they part 
of an evelope, were they just isolated one by one, how were you 
shown these pictures? 
PROS: It is still the second time you are referring to? 
NB: Yes. 
A: How was I shown pictures? 
Q: Mm hmm. Were they separate pictures? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Were they part of an evelope that had a series of different 
pictures on it or can you recall? 
A: Just one of two, as I recall. A side view and a front view. 
Q: Then there were just separate photographs. 
A: Right. 
Q: Was this at your home or was it again out from your work? 
A: I went outside from work. 
Q: And what was it that the officer said to you when he showed you 
those photographs? 
A: He asked if I would be able to recognize anybody after the 
display that he got from whatever he called it. 
Q: Okay, uh, did the officer talk to you about any suspects 
that have been arrested on the case. 
A: No. 
Q: Did you have any information that some of the jewels had been 
recovered at that point. 
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Q: Had you talked to Joanne about the case since it happened? 
A: Meaning what about? 
Q: Anything about, surrounding the case, about circumstances 
surrounding the case. 
A: Oh, just about how we felt basically. 
Q: Didn't she tell you that some people had been arrested in 
California on the case. 
A: Afterwards I think she did, but I don't think before. 
Q: So, before you were shown the photo arrays, you had not talked 
to Joanne about the fact that people had been arrested in California. 
A: I don't recall. 
Q: You don't recall or you don't think she did. 
A: I don't think so, no, I don't think I did. Because Joanne 
wasn't there that much. 
Q: Nothing futher. 
CROSS EXAMINATION: (Ms. Wells) 
Q: Kyarsguaard 
A-: Kyarsguaard 
Q: Kyarsguaard 
A: Uh huh. 
Q: I think that is probably why Nancy asked if she could call you 
Stella. 
A: I think so. 
Q: The man that you touched on the shoulder today, how, if any way, 
does he appear different to you today he would have appeared in that 
store when you saw him. 
A: He hasn't got the (inaudible) in the hair. 
Q: What else. 
A: He hasn't got glasses on. 
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Q: Anything else. 
A: He is not dressed the same. 
Q: How would you have described the length of his hair on, in 
August. 
A: About, just, neck length. 
Q: I need you to speak up a little bit. 
A: Just below the ear. 
Q: Now, how about the sides of his hair. How were they. Were they 
cut, not cut, or how far did they extend from say the top of the 
ear. 
A: Ifm not sure I quite understand what you mean there. 
Q: Well, on the sides, woere the sides shorter than the back, or 
was it all one lenght. 
A: Well, he had a hat on, it is difficult to say. 
Q: Did the cap cover all of his hair? 
A: The cap came down to here and then the hair was down. 
Q: Alright, now the part that was down, that is what I am talking 
about. What were you able to see as far as hair over his ears. 
A: Black hair. 
Q: I am talking about the length though. 
A: Oh, just -
Q: They can't pick that up on the recording so... 
A: Uh, oh. 
Q: Did hair cover his ears? 
A: I can't remember. 
Q: You have no memory of that at all. 
A: Nope. 
Q: Now if looking at the man in the middle who has the braids, have 
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Q: You know then that it, by raising the hair, it will make it 
appear much shorter than it would be if it were loose, correct? 
A: Right. 
Q: So assuming that this man had his hair unbraided now, would you 
expect that his hair would be longer on the sides, long on the sides? 
A: Right, it would be longer. 
Q: And yet you can't recall seeing any hair. 
A: The stocking hat. 
Q: ....The proper length, right, over the ears. 
A: Well, it wasn't short short like a man would wear, it was longer 
A: down, to me, just past the ears. Here. 
Q: Alright, now again, are we talking about the sides or are we 
talking about the back. 
A: We are talking about this view here. This side view. 
Q: Did you tell the police officers anything about the length 
of his hair? 
A: Mm, I probably did, I don1t know. 
Q: Do you recall what you told them. 
A: It was short hair, longish dark hair. 
Q: Your recollection now is that you would have told them that 
it was longish-dark hair. 
A: Black hair, excuse me, black hair. 
Q: Long black hair. 
A: Longish black hair, not long. 
Q: What would you have told them about the first man's ethenic 
background. 
A: It was Mexican. 
A: What did you tell them about his facial hair. 
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A: Okay, did you tell them how long the mustache might have been 
or where it might have come to on his face. 
A: I do think I did, yes. 
Q: Alright, you do think you told them all that. 
A: I think so. 
Q: Okay, do you think you could be mistaken about the description 
that you gave to the police. 
A: No, I don' t. 
Q: So it would be your testimony that you didn't give this brief 
description. That it was a Mexican male, short, with a mustache. 
You would have told them more than that. 
A: I told them whatever they asked me. I could remember what, they 
asked me what I saw then at the time. 
Q: But it is your recollection that you gave them more information 
than the fact that he was a Mexican male, short and has a mustache. 
A: Yes, I gave them what he was wearing. 
Q: What did you tell them he was wearing? 
A: I said he was wearing a navy blue suit. A navy blue boiler 
suit. 
PROS: Excuse me, I didn't hear what kind of a suit it was. 
A: A navy blue boiler suit. 
Q: Boiler, 
A: And apparently here, that is a jump suit,* I don't know. 
0: Now did Detective Horiuchi show you a photo spread, did you 
say. Is he the one who did that? 
A: Mm Hmm. 
Q: And were you shown any pictures from which you took out or 
picked the picture of the man you saw in the front. Were you able 
to nick out somebody from that photo spread? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: You were. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay, do you recall how many pictures you were shown. 
A: I say about five or six. 
Q: Were you shown two groups of pictures, one of what was believed 
t20 be the man in front, perhaps one showing the man in back? 
A. Well, I didn't know who it was supposed to be. 
Q: Okay, you were only shown five pictures total, or were you 
shown two groups of pictures. 
A: I was shown groups, two different times, two groups. 
Q: Now, did you pick out two individuals then. 
A: No, I picked just the one. 
Q: Just the one. 
A: Mm Hmm. 
Q: Did the person when he, as you said, grabbed you and pushed you, 
was it your impression that he was doing that to facilitate moving 
you to the back of the room. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Alright, not such that those particular acts themselves were 
meant to harm you. 
A: Oh, I don't quite get what you mean there. 
Q: Okay, when you were grabbed and pushed. 
A: Uh huh. 
Q: Was it your impression at that time that he was doing that in 
order to get you to the back of the room. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Alright, no threats were made to you involving his physically 
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A: No, mm mm. 
Q: Now the person that you kept hearing the man with the 
gun call out to , said that the name he used was MGeorgeM? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did that man respond to those calls? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you hear any other names used. 
A: No. 
Q: Did you ever hear anyone speak who would have had any type of a 
foreign accent that you recognized. 
A: Well, no, not really. 
Q: When the man pushed you, grabbed you and pushed you, was he to the 
back of you, I assume, since he was using a pushing motion. 
A: Yes. 
Q: So you didn't have the total amount of time that you were with 
him when you were able to actually observe his face, is that right? 
As he is pushing you from the back, you can't see his face can you? 
A: No, correct. 
Q: And how long did it take to get you from the place that he 
grabbed your arm and began to push you until you lost contact 
with him. 
A: Well, it was so quick, maybe two or three minutes. 
Q: It took two or three minutes to walk. 
A: I don't know, I am only assuming that. 
Q: Do you have a watch on ? 
A: No, I don't. It was only a couple of seconds but it seemed 
like three minutes. 
Q: Okay, that is what I want you to think about and perhaps if 
T/nn 1 nnl< nn there at the clock and vou see that second hand going 
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around, okay, when it gets to the nine I am going to say start and 
then I want you to say stop when the amount of time has gone by 
that it took you to be pushed into the back. From the time of 
contact to the back room. 
I missed the nine so we will go to the 12. 
A: About now. 
Q: Okay now. 
A: It was three seconds there. 
Q: Okay, now, do you revise your earlier estimates then. 
A: Oh, yes. 
Q: Okay, so it was not a matter of two or three minutes that it 
took to push you back but a matter of maybe two or three seconds. 
A: Probably. 
Q: Okay, which means that you had, not a very long time, in which 
to observe him at all. 
A: Long enough. 
Q: Okay, My question is that you didn't have a very long period 
of time. 
A: No. I didn't have a long time. 
Q: Alright, And some of that time was with him behind you. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Let me show you what has been marked as State's Exhibit 
P21A and P21C and ask if you can familiarize yourself with the 
individual in those pictures who is wearing a blue T-shirt. 
A: No. 
Q: Well, I'm not asking you to identify the person, I am just 
asking you to familiarize yourself with the pictures. 
A: Okay. 
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and then looking at the man who is seated in the middle that 
that is the same person or not. 
A: No. 
Q: It is not. 
A: I wouldn't say so. 
Q: Alright, and what can you, other than the hair, being in 
braids, or not being in braids, what do you articulate as the 
difference between the person pictured in that picture and the man 
seated in the middle. 
A: Well, his nose looks different. 
Q: The nose looks different? 
A: It looks different to me. 
Q: How is it different? 
A: Oh, it is a bit more. That nose is a little bit more crooked, 
if that is the word I want to use. 
Q: Okay, the person in the picture's nose is crooked. 
A: Okay, The mouth is different. , 
Q: The mouth is different. 
A: Mm hmm. And the mustache looks different. 
Q: How is the mustache different. 
A: His is all here, cut here. 
Q: Which one are you talking about, which one, are you describing 
the gentleman in the middle here. 
A: Yes, it goes all the way across and this one curves here and 
goes like that. 
Q: That is going to be hard for the record to pick that up. 
Okay, but it is your testimony that you do not believe that this 
is the same man as that one. 
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Q: Now, looking at that person again, is that, could that have 
been the person that came into your store and that you have 
identified as being the man who pushed you into the back. 
A: No, I donTt think so. 
Q: You are sure of that. 
MAY THE RECORD REFLECT THAT THE WITNESS HAS REFERRED TO THE 
EXHIBITS P21A AND P21C. 
Q: Was that picture ever, or a picture of that man ever submitted 
to you within the group of pictures that Detective Horiuchi present-
ed to you. 
A: Oh, I couldnft tell you. 
PROS. I!m sorry I couldn't hear that answer. 
A: I couln't tell you. I mean there are so many, I mean there 
was you know. 
Q: So you donft think you have ever seen another picture of that 
person before. 
A: I could have, it could have been, but not the same. 
Q: Do you think those two persons resemble one another? 
A: No I don1t. 
Q: You don't 
A: No. 
Q: Would you be surprised if someone were to tell you that they 
were related? 
A: (laugh) Not really. 
Q: Alright, and why is that? Because they look enough alike that 
they may be related? 
A: It is hard to say , I mean. 
Q: Well, okay, my question to you was if you would be suprised 
if they were related and you said no. 
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Q: Why, Why would that not 
A: Because of (inaudible) and a brother, or. 
Q: Are you basing that though on the physical resemblance 
between the two of them? 
A: No. 
Q: What are you basing that on, then. 
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ADDENDUM D 
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INSTRUCTION NO • 3L 
One of the important issues in this case is the identificatior 
of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The State has 
the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It 
is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as 
to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the 
identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impres-
sion by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the 
witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense, in 
order to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you 
should consider the following: 
L. Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and 
adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or close 
the witness was, how good were the lighting conditions, whether 
the witness had an opportunity to see or know the person in the 
past. J 
Y\ 6,,-A 
0
 ^ 'tt.VJfc. 
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[Sr 
i! In connection with this, you may consider the fact, if such 
:
 -i 
j, has been shown to you, that the witness has failed to identify 
i i 
i i 
;j the defendant on prior occasions or has identified another person 
•j instead of the defendant on prior occasions. 
!|-
; 2. Are you satisfied that the identification made by the 
!j 
'! witness was the product of his own recollection? 
it 
You may take into account both the strength of the identifi-
j ; 
ji cation, and the circumstances under which the identification was 
limade. If the identification by the witness may have been influ-
! 1 
i i 
j
 (enced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented 
,
;
 to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification 
. with great care. You may also consider the length of time that 
lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity 
of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the 
reliability of the identification. 
; It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof on the 
prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this 
j specif ically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable"""^ 
doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime 
• I with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, 
,; you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifica-
l tion, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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fISTtA** rpnNT*.UTAH 
BROOKE C. WELLS (#3421) 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t flfC l l 2> 3 8 1 1 ^ * ^ 
S a l t L a k e L e g a l D e f e n d e r A s s o c i a t i o n * * 
333 S o u t h S e c o n d E a s t fLOlXOtt «l»ltLr • 'CLERK 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 ^ J M DISL cjyST 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 2 - 5 444 rfr^^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II 
AND III OF AMENDED INFORMATION 
Case No. CR-84-1266 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, PAUL ANTHONY BRANCH, by and 
through his attorney of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves this 
Court for an Order dismissing Count II, Aggravated Assault, and 
Count III, Theft, of the Amended Information. The Motion is made 
for the reason that Aggravated Assault and Theft are lesser 
included offenses of the crime of Aggravated Robbery. Inclusion 
of these Counts in the Information if presented to the jury will 
prejudice the Defendant and deny him the right to a fair trial 
as guaranteed by the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th^s ^£& day of December, 1984. 
\Q^W4JL o, 
BROOKE C, WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this j \ day of December, 1984. 
\X^A Mk 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Joseph 
Fratto, Jr. 431 South 300 East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 
this O- I day of December, 1984. 
U A l 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Edward 
Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, this /)\ day 
of December, 1984. 
wJBM-
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RULE 3.6. PLEAS OF GUILTY 
(a) AdmoaJUoaj to Defeadaat. 
<b) Deftraiaiag Whether (IK Plea is VohiaUry. 
(c) DelenaJaJag FactvaJ Basil for Pie*. 
(d) Vm pf Affidavit of Defeadaat. 
Upon entry of a plea of guilty to a criminal 
charge, before acceptance thereof, there must be 
substantial compliance with the following: 
(a) Admonitions to Defendant. 
The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first making certain that the defendant un-
derstands the following: ' . • - • , .- »')' • 
(1) The nature of the charge. 
(2) The minimum and maximum sentence prescri-
bed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty 
to which the defendant may be subjected, including 
any consecutive sentences, if given; 
(3) That the defendant has the right to plead not 
guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already 
been made, or to plead guilty; and 
(4) That if he pleads guilty there will not be a 
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he 
waives the right to a trial by jury, the right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, the right 
against self incrimination, and the right to appeal a 
conviction. 
(b) Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary. 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
without first determining that the plea is voluntary. 
If the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreeme-
nt, the agreement shall be stated and confirmed in 
open court. The court shall determine whether, any 
force of threats or any promises, apart from a plea 
agreement, were used to obtain the plea. .••-
(c) Determining Factual Basis for Plea. 
The court shall not enter final judgment on a plea 
of guilty without first determining that there is a 
factual basis for the plea, and that all requirements 
of law for acceptance of a guilty plea have been 
m e t . . - » . . : • . . • . - . . 
(d) Use of Affidavit of Defendant. 
The Court may establish the foregoing requirem-
ents in the record by use of a written affidavit 
executed by the defendant before the court, the 
substance of which shall be in substantially the 
form as contained in the "Affidavit of Defendant" 
form. 
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